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Lawyers for White People? 
by Jessie Allen* 
Wait a minute.  Are you telling me that after I graduate I 
could go downtown and hang out a sign that says 
“Lawyers for White People”? 
- Student in my Professional Responsibility class 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the American Bar Association adopted a new Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct that for the first time forbids lawyers from 
discriminating on the basis of race or sex, among other protected 
characteristics.1  It is rather shocking that it took so long for the most 
influential source of legal ethics standards in the United States to identify 
discrimination as an ethical violation.  After all it has been over 50 years 
since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited restaurants and hotels from 
excluding customers because of race.2  But the delay in promulgation is 
not the most surprising thing about the new rule.  That honor goes to the 
rule’s penultimate sentence, which apparently exempts lawyers’ client 
selection.3  What gives?  Why would the ABA’s first black-letter legal 
ethics rule against discrimination exclude prospective clients from its 
coverage? 
The answer has implications that run well beyond rules of professional 
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 1.   “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (g) engage in conduct that the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, 
national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or 
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.  This paragraph does not limit the ability 
of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16.  This 
paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.”  MODEL 
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 2.   See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.  
 3.   MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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responsibility.  Paradoxically, under prevailing civil rights doctrine, an 
ethics rule prohibiting discrimination in client selection might be used to 
disable some of the very practitioners most committed to addressing 
persistent inequalities in our legal system.  This counterintuitive effect 
results from the way the ascendant “anti-classification” approach has 
deformed civil rights doctrine in the United States.4  Anti-classification 
forbids consideration of protected characteristics like race, gender or 
sexual orientation,5 even when that consideration aims to redress rather 
than perpetuate stigma and inequality.  In the vocabulary of today’s 
progressive civil rights movement, anti-classification blocks “anti-racist” 
policies and practices.6 
For instance, in the prevailing anti-classification regime, a rule against 
discrimination in client selection might prohibit lawyers from prioritizing 
African American clients in excessive force claims or from representing 
only women in employment discrimination claims.7  Indeed, the only 
reported court decision applying state civil rights law to a lawyer’s client 
selection is a 2003 Massachusetts ruling against a feminist family lawyer 
who refused to represent a man in a divorce case.8  Judith Nathanson “had 
earned a law degree with the purpose of helping to advance the status of 
women in the legal system.”9  She was held liable for violating state public 
accommodations law.10 
Of course, the ABA rule does not expressly authorize discriminatory 
 
 4.   See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (plurality opinion) 
(citations omitted) (“[T]he level of scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged 
classification operates against a group that historically has not been subject to governmental 
discrimination.”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(citations omitted) (“[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on 
the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (holding that an alleged benign purpose does not exempt racial 
classification from presumption of illegitimacy). 
 5.   This Article uses the term “sex discrimination” to encompass discrimination on the basis of 
either gender or sexual orientation.  See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020) 
(holding “sex discrimination” within Title VII encompasses discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity).  
 6.   As Robert J. Patterson puts it: “Anti-racism is an active and conscious effort to work  
against multidimensional aspects of racism.”  Hillary Hoffower, What It Really Means to Be an  
Anti-Racist, and Why it’s Not the Same as Being an Ally, BUS. INSIDER  
(June 8, 2020, 10:16 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-anti-racism-how-to-be-anti-
racist-2020-6 [https://perma.cc/7EAM-WY2R]; see also IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN 
ANTIRACIST 13 (2019). 
 7.   See Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice: A Guide for 
State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 227 (2017). 
 8.   Nathanson v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, 
at *1.  Despite this ruling, at least one firm, Cordell & Cordell, continues to advertise as divorce 
attorneys for men in Massachusetts.  See CORDELL & CORDELL, infra note 85. 
 9.   Nathanson, 2003 WL 22480688, at *1 n.1. 
 10.   Id. at *7.  
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client selection.  By its own terms, it simply “does not limit the ability of 
a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation” in 
accordance with the pre-existing rules that say nothing about 
discrimination.11  Even if the existing rules could be read to implicitly 
forbid discrimination,12 though, the choice to exclude prospective clients 
from the new anti-discrimination rule seems odd.  The records of the ABA 
rule adoption process are largely silent on the reasoning behind the 
exemption for client selection.13  So we do not know whether the ABA 
delegates had Nathanson’s case in mind as a cautionary tale.  We don’t 
know if the drafters sought to avoid directly forbidding discriminatory 
client selection, fearing it might do more harm than good under the anti-
classification analysis it would likely receive.  But in the legal world we 
currently inhabit that would have been a perfectly rational choice. 
Yet, shying away from condemning discrimination against 
prospective clients hardly seems ethical.  While this approach may protect 
politically motivated client-selection practices, it does so by weakening 
civil rights protection for individuals seeking legal representation.14  
Moreover, as an expression of the core norms of legal practice, the 
exemption sends a terrible message that lawyers enjoy an elite prerogative 
to refuse service based purely on personal bias.  Perhaps most important, 
as a practical matter it disincentivizes law firms from examining their 
client selection procedures with an eye toward identifying and remedying 
practices that produce discriminatory results.  After all, if the ABA will 
not say clearly that discriminatory client selection is unethical, why should 
a firm work to avoid it? 
The arguments of this Article therefore have a double purpose.  The 
first aim is to frame an alternative regulatory approach that would declare 
firmly that rejecting clients based on stigma and stereotypes is deeply 
unethical.  The goal is to forbid discriminatory exclusion and encourage 
law firms to monitor their client selection policies for bias, without 
destroying lawyers’ ability to prioritize representing groups who have 
been subordinated in our legal system.  But the Article also aims to use the 
problem of crafting and defending such a rule to illuminate the deeply 
 
 11.   MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also id. r. 1.16.   
 12.   See infra Part I. 
 13.   See Memorandum from the ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Pro. Resp., Memorandum 
on Draft Proposal to Amend Model Rule 8.4 (Dec. 22, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 ABA Memo], 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/rule_8_4_l
anguage_choice_memo_12_22_2015.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG4F-YHGK]; MODEL 
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
 14.   Moreover, as Nathanson shows, those lawyers may remain subject to liability when states 
are ready to enforce generally applicable public accommodations laws against them.  See Nathanson, 
2003 WL 22480688, at *3–4.  
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distorting influence of anti-classification doctrine in civil rights law more 
broadly. 
After considering the institutional and legal context in which the ABA 
exemption was adopted, I propose an alternative rule—one that expressly 
forbids discrimination against prospective clients and adopts an overtly 
“anti-subordination” approach.  In contrast to anti-classification’s focus on 
uniform treatment of individuals, anti-subordination focuses on 
recognizing and remedying systemic inequality.15  Nathanson’s practice of 
exclusively representing women in divorce actions embodied an anti-
subordination approach, because she aimed to select clients in a way that 
would dismantle gender hierarchy.16  She considered sex when choosing 
whom to represent, in order to actively resist what she believed, with 
considerable objective reason, was the legal system’s tendency to 
subordinate women.17  In legal scholarship, anti-subordination is 
sometimes presented as a relic of an earlier political era, or the province 
of academics.18  The implication seems to be that anti-classification is a 
more realistic and straightforward way to embody ideals of equality, and 
that anti-subordination has failed because it is a creation of a bunch of 
liberal egg heads out of step with real world relationships.  But this is 
completely backwards. 
More and more these days, anti-subordination coincides with popular 
 
 15.   See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9 (2003) (“Antisubordination 
theorists contend that guarantees of equal citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of pervasive 
social stratification . . . .”).  Owen Fiss is often credited with first fully articulating the tension between 
two different views in civil rights law, calling them the “antidiscrimination” and “group-
disadvantaging” principles.  See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFFS. 107, 108 (1976); see also Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards 
a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 206–07 (2010) (noting that 
anti-subordination advocates understand the Equal Protection Clause “to bar those government actions 
that have the intent or the effect of perpetuating traditional patterns of hierarchy,” while anti-
classification theorists “take the view that the Constitution prohibits government from ‘[r]educ[ing] 
an individual to an assigned racial identity for differential treatment.’” (quoting Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 795 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part))).  
 16.   See Nathanson, 2003 WL 22480688, at *1 n.1. 
 17.   Id. 
 18.   See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (2006); Sergio J. Campos, Subordination and the Fortuity of Our 
Circumstances, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 587 (2008).  But see Francisco Valdes, LatCrit 2013 
Conference Symposium Afterword: Theorizing and Building Critical Coalitions: Outsider Society and 
Academic Praxis in Local/Global Justice Struggles, 12 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 983, 985 (2014) 
(describing a community of “academics and activists committed equally to critical approaches toward 
anti-subordination theory and action”); cf. Sheila I. Vélez Martínez, Towards an Outcrit Pedagogy of 
Anti-Subordination in the Classroom, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585, 587–88 (2015) (proposing that anti-
subordination theorists should practice what they preach and “teach in a way that challenges the power 
differential between professors and students and fosters a horizontal teaching and learning 
community.”). 
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political morality.  It is not only political leftists and Black Lives Matter 
activists who recognize the systemic persistence of racial hierarchy.  We 
are living in a time when a centrist Democrat running for, and winning, 
the Presidency declares, “the fact of the matter is, there is institutional 
racism in America.”19  Opinion polls in summer 2020 show that a large 
majority of Americans (76%) now say that racial discrimination is a big 
problem in the United States, and 57% believe that Black Americans are 
more likely than Whites to be the targets of police violence.20  These are 
stark increases from just a few years ago when only about half of 
Americans viewed discrimination as a major problem and around a third 
saw Blacks as more likely to experience excessive force.21  That is not to 
say that White Americans favor explicit racial preferences to address this 
unequal situation.  Indeed, it seems that while a majority of Whites 
approve of “affirmative action” in the abstract, that does not translate into 
support for direct government action to redress racial inequality.22  But 
certainly the awakening to systemic racism does not align with a “color 
blind” approach to anti-discrimination law.  And recently some state 
lawmakers are pushing back against the view that it is unconstitutional to 
channel benefits to groups disadvantaged by longstanding discrimination.  
In response to the Covid-19 pandemic’s disproportionate harm to Black 
Americans, due to economic and health disparities that stem from racial 
discrimination, the Oregon legislature earmarked more than half of the 
state’s federal Covid-19 aid for Black residents.  Predictably, a lawsuit was 
filed charging that distributing aid on racial lines violates equal 
protection.23 
In the context of a country increasingly aware of systemic racism, 
exempting client selection from the ABA’s new explicit ban on 
 
 19.   CNBC Television, Joe Biden: There Is Institutional Racism in America, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 
2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBz_licONG4 [https://perma.cc/5ZZS-DXHF].  
 20.   Protestors’ Anger Justified Even If Actions May Not Be, MONMOUTH U. POLLING INST. 
(June 2, 2020), https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/reports/monmouthpoll_us_060220/ 
[https://perma.cc/6ESW-R8UA].   
 21.   Id.; see also Justin Worland, America’s Long Overdue Awakening to Systemic Racism, TIME 
(June 11, 2020, 6:41 AM), https://time.com/5851855/systemic-racism-america/ 
[https://perma.cc/7WM8-TB7C] (observing that thousands of White Americans have joined summer 
2020 protests against police killings of African Americans).  
 22.   “Americans are divided about government action to improve the social and  
economic condition of Blacks.  A slight plurality of respondents says some help is needed (43 percent),  
but the majority (57 percent) are either undecided or opposed to systemic help.”  Poll:  
Americans’ Views of Systemic Racism Divided by Race, UMASS LOWELL  
(Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.uml.edu/News/press-releases/2020/SocialIssuesPoll092220.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/XMB6-CHDE]. 
 23.   See Cocina Cultura LLC v. Oregon, No. 3:20-cv-02022-IM, 2020 WL 7181584, at *4–5 (D. 
Or. Dec. 7, 2020) (denying motion for preliminary injunction because, although “the race-based 
criterion may indeed prove unconstitutional,” plaintiff failed to prove irreparable harm). 
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discrimination looks more problematic than ever.  But in the counter-
intuitive doctrinal regime that has taken over U.S. civil rights law, 
expressly forbidding discriminatory client selection risks creating a rule 
that would punish the very lawyers most dedicated to dismantling anti-
democratic hierarchies.  There is an old saying that “bad facts make bad 
law,”24 but this looks like a case of bad legal doctrine making it impossible 
to make any law at all.  With this in mind, I set out to do three things: 
understand the practical and doctrinal context that led to this peculiar 
regulatory result, frame an anti-discrimination rule that would explicitly 
protect lawyers’ principled consideration of clients’ race and sex while 
prohibiting stigmatic bias, and see what defending such a rule would 
reveal about the way anti-classification doctrine affects regulatory 
choices. 
Part I of this Article traces the anti-discrimination rule’s evolution 
through the ABA process and explains how disavowing coverage of client 
selection may work to protect two groups of lawyers whose political 
interests ordinarily diverge.  Part II steps back to ask whether we need an 
ethics rule forbidding discriminatory client selection.  Despite a great 
flowering recently of studies documenting race and sex disparities in law 
firms’ employment practices, there have been few investigations of the 
part race and sex play in law firms’ interactions with prospective clients, 
who they choose to represent, and the terms on which they offer their 
services.  This part also addresses the objection that, because lawyers serve 
clients through expressive advocacy, prohibiting discriminatory client 
selection would violate lawyers’ First Amendment rights of expressive 
association.  Part III proposes a legal ethics rule that forbids rejecting 
clients based on race or sex stereotypes and stigma, but protects lawyers’ 
race- and sex-conscious client selection as part of an intentional practice 
aimed at redressing inequality.  Then I defend the proposed rule against 
constitutional challenges. 
As a matter of equal protection, an anti-subordination rule can be 
defended even in today’s anti-classification culture.25  The benefits of a 
diverse legal system are not confined to disadvantaged groups.  In our 
common law system, legal rules are shaped by the claims and interests 
brought to courts and so by the circumstances and identities of the litigants.  
Just as the absence of Black voices distorts education for all, the legal 
system’s failure to recognize race and sex hierarchies and represent the 
interests of subordinated groups distorts the law itself.26  Even if it survives 
 
 24.   See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 25.   See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).   
 26.   See id. at 330–33.   
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equal protection review, however, the proposed rule faces a more 
threatening viewpoint discrimination claim.27 
Considering an anti-subordination approach to client selection leads 
to two principal conclusions, one practical and the other involving 
constitutional interpretation.  As a practical matter, it highlights how little 
we know about how prospective clients’ race and sex affect their ability to 
obtain legal counsel.28  There are reasons to suspect that access to legal 
representation is systematically unequal.29  But without knowing more 
about whether and how inequalities arise, it is hard to fashion a rule of 
professional responsibility to address them.  So, this Article’s most 
concrete recommendation is for empirical work to fill these knowledge 
gaps. 
On the constitutional front, defending my proposed ethics rule exposes 
the way anti-classification doctrine affects our understanding of rights 
provisions outside the Fourteenth Amendment.  Most critiques of anti-
classification focus on equal protection doctrine.30  But it turns out that the 
strongest objections to the proposed anti-subordination rule are based on 
a claim of viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment.31  
Through the cracked anti-classification lens, a rule that forbids race 
discrimination but allows private attorneys to pursue anti-racist client 
selection looks like a violation of government’s duty to avoid taking 
ideological sides.32  Ironically, although that rule allows consideration of 
race or sex only in narrow, arguably benign, circumstances, it would face 
daunting constitutional challenges, while a rule exempting all client-
selection discrimination would sail through judicial review. 
Arguably, it was not the job of the ABA drafters to insist that a much-
needed anti-discrimination rule confront anti-classification’s distortion of 
civil rights doctrine.  Indeed, adopting a rule like the one I propose might 
 
 27.   Note that Josh Blackman criticizes as viewpoint discrimination Comment 4 to ABA Model 
Rule 8.4(g), which states that “[l]awyers may engage in conduct undertaken to promote diversity and 
inclusion” in employment policies without violating the rule.  Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for 
State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 259–60 (2017) (quoting 
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)).   
 28.   See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 
34 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 339, 350 (2008).   
 29.   See id.; Deborah L. Rhode, Law Is The Least Diverse Profession in the Nation.  And Lawyers 
Aren’t Doing Enough to Change That., WASH. POST (May 27, 2015, 7:25 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/27/law-is-the-least-diverse-profession-
in-the-nation-and-lawyers-arent-doing-enough-to-change-that/ [https://perma.cc/BND6-LUTK].   
 30.   For two exceptions that focus on the First Amendment, see generally Genevieve Lakier, 
Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2018) and Luke A. 
Boso, Anti-LGBT Free Speech and Group Subordination, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3630648 [https://perma.cc/JD5A-W66D].    
 31.   Cf. Blackman, supra note 27.   
 32.   See id.   
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have done more to elevate than expose the anti-classification approach, 
given that the anti-subordination exemption might not survive a viewpoint 
discrimination challenge.  But if legal scholars have a role to play in legal 
reform, it would seem to entail bringing to light the way narrow regulatory 
problems are sometimes driven by broad structural distortions in our legal 
system.  Hence this article. 
I. THE ABA ADOPTS AN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION RULE PROTECTING 
EVERYONE EXCEPT PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS 
[W]hat is more important to the integrity of the law than 
ensuring that those who seek out legal representation are 
not subject to discrimination . . . ?
33
 
When the ABA adopted Model Rule 8.4(g) in August 2016, it was the 
first black-letter prohibition on discrimination in the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct since their origination in 1983.34  The rule’s 
coverage is sweeping.  It forbids any act “the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know is harassment or discrimination . . . in conduct related to the 
practice of law.”35  Yet it expressly declines to alter the status quo in one 
fundamental part of legal practice, explaining that “[t]his paragraph does 
not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a 
representation in accordance with Rule 1.16.”36 
Rule 1.16, “Declining or Terminating Representation,” certainly does 
not expressly authorize a lawyer to reject clients for racist or sexist 
reasons.37  But neither does it explicitly prohibit it.  After addressing 
situations that mandate refusing or abandoning a representation, Rule 1.16 
lists circumstances in which lawyers are permitted to withdraw from a 
representation once they have taken on a client.38  Those circumstances are 
broadly permissive, but not totally unlimited.39 
Arguably, Rule 1.16 can be read to implicitly forbid a discriminatory 
withdrawal from an ongoing representation.  Although the rule authorizes 
withdrawal if “the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer 
considers repugnant,” withdrawing because a client’s action is repugnant 
seems fundamentally different than withdrawing because a lawyer finds a 
 
 33.   2015 ABA Memo, supra note 13, at 2.   
 34.   Prior ethical codes and canons similarly lacked any prohibition on discrimination.   
 35.   MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
 36.   Id.   
 37.   See id. r. 1.16(a)–(b).  
 38.   See id.  
 39.   See id. 
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client repugnant on account of race or sex.40  Besides the specific bases 
offered, the rule permits leaving a representation if “other good cause for 
withdrawal exists,” but stigmatic bias against a group can hardly be 
counted as a “good cause.”41  Someone might say that 1.16(b)(1)—
authorizing withdrawal if it “can be accomplished without material 
adverse effect on the interests of the client”—allows discriminatory 
withdrawals.42  If other lawyers are available, and switching 
representations will not add costs, racist and sexist withdrawals might be 
permitted under this no-harm-no-foul section.  But perhaps discriminatory 
rejections are always harmful, and always have a “material adverse effect” 
on the most fundamental interest of all, one’s personhood. 
The harm of discriminatory service denial is not primarily loss of 
access but denial of dignity.  That was the theory anyway, of the Court’s 
early public accommodations cases.  As Justice Goldberg explained, 
quoting from the Congressional report that accompanied the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, “[d]iscrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers 
and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a 
person must surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member 
of the public because of his race or color.”43  In this view, refusing legal 
services to someone out of racist or sexist bias inflicts a dignitary injury 
that in and of itself amounts to material adversity and so cannot be excused 
by 1.16(b)(1). 
Moreover, in practice, a lack of “material adverse effect” is rarely 
offered alone as a basis for withdrawal.  And, despite the rule’s text, there 
are some situations in which withdrawal is treated as unethical even 
without quantifiable harm, at least by some legal decisionmakers.44  For 
instance, citing a lawyer’s fundamental duty of loyalty to clients, courts 
sometimes refuse to allow lawyers to withdraw from a client’s case in 
order to take on a new, more lucrative representation that would otherwise 
raise a conflict of interest.45  Most legal decision makers probably would 
be reluctant to endorse a lawyer’s withdrawal from a case upon 
 
 40.   Id. r. 1.16(b)(4).  
 41.   Id. r. 1.16(b)(7).  
 42.   Id. r. 1.16(b)(1). 
 43.   Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 292 (1964) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring).  
 44.   I thank Stephen Gillers for pointing this out to me and for offering the example of the “hot 
potato” cases. 
 45.   See, e.g., W. Sugar Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1084 (C.D. 
Cal. 2015) (holding that “[t]he ‘hot potato rule’ bars an attorney and law firm from curing the dual 
representation of clients by expediently severing the relationship with the preexisting client”); 
Markham Concepts, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 3d 345, 349 (D.R.I. 2016) (refusing to allow 
law firm to cure conflict of interest by dropping client, because “[s]uch a rule would render 
meaningless the duty of loyalty a lawyer owes to his or her clients . . . .”).  
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discovering the client was Black.  If dumping a client for profit is 
questionable, discriminatory withdrawal might well be seen as a more 
pernicious violation of the basic duty of client loyalty. 
That still leaves open the question of discriminatory refusals to take 
on clients in the first place, about which Rule 1.16 is completely silent.  
That silence offers no express limit on reasons for rejecting clients.  But 
neither does it explicitly authorize discriminatory rejections.  Stephen 
Gillers therefore argues that even though Rule 8.4(g) defers to 1.16, the 
new rule forbids declining representation “because of the person’s 
membership in one of the protected groups.”46  Others understand Rule 
8.4(g) to leave in place a traditional prerogative to turn away prospective 
clients for any reason at all—including overtly racist or sexist exclusion.47 
Besides watering down protection for prospective clients, the 
exemption sends a message that is at best confusing in a text that shapes 
legal practice throughout the United States.  Most American lawyers first 
absorb the ethical norms of their profession through the ABA Model 
Rules.  All students at ABA accredited law schools, the vast majority of 
law schools in the United States,48 are required to take a course on legal 
ethics or “professional responsibility.”49  In many, if not most, of these 
courses, the ABA Model Rules are the central source of authority.  
Admission to the bar in all but a handful of U.S. jurisdictions requires a 
passing score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, which 
is based on the ABA Model Rules.50  In addition, every state has a code of 
 
 46.   Gillers, supra note 7, at 233.  Margaret Tarkington points out that Gillers’s reading makes 
sense of a comment to Rule 8.4(g), which declares that a lawyer does not violate the rule “by limiting 
the lawyer’s practice to members of underserved populations in accordance with these Rules and other 
law.”  MARGARET TARKINGTON, VOICE OF JUSTICE: RECLAIMING THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF 
LAWYERS 269–70 (2018) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2016)).  As Tarkington notes, the comment seems unnecessary if the rule exempts client selection.  
Tarkington, however, declares that “[t]he best reading of Model Rule 8.4(g) is that it does not change 
the autonomy of private lawyers to decline cases, and should a jurisdiction adopt the rule, the lawyer 
retains complete autonomy to decline matters.”  Id. at 269. 
 47.   See, e.g., TARKINGTON, supra note 46, at 269. 
 48.   There are currently 199 accredited institutions that make up about 85% of U.S.  
law schools.  ABA-Approved Law Schools, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org 
/groups/legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/ [https://perma.cc/D5HL-ZTN5] (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2021); see also Non-ABA-Approved Law Schools, LSAC, 
https://www.lsac.org/choosing-law-school/find-law-school/non-aba-approved-law-schools [https:// 
perma.cc/3XCR-2E3Z] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021). 
 49.   ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2020–2021,  
AM. BAR ASS’N 18, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education 
_and_ admissions_to_the_bar/standards/2020-2021/2020-21-aba-standards-and-rules-chapter3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EQ76-AY83] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).  
 50.   “The MPRE is based on the law governing the conduct and discipline of lawyers and judges, 
including the disciplinary rules of professional conduct currently articulated in the American Bar 
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legal ethics, under which lawyers can be disciplined for ethical violations, 
and all state codes track the organization and much of the content of the 
ABA Model Rules.51  In many states, additions to the Model Rules are 
regularly incorporated in the enforceable legal ethics code.52  To be sure, 
sometimes ethical norms from other sources appear in state codes, but the 
ABA model rules are by far the most consistent single source of rule 
changes in states across the country.53  So a new model rule forbidding 
discrimination by lawyers has the potential to influence both enforceable 
law and widespread professional norms.  With all that at stake, it’s hard to 
see why the ABA drafters would choose to water down the new rule’s 
ostensible main purpose: “ensuring that those who seek out legal 
representation are not subject to discrimination.”54  But the rule’s 






Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .”  Preparing for the MPRE, NAT’L 
CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/mpre/preparing/ [https://perma.cc/P3WN-
V69B] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).  
 51.   California, once the lone holdout, recently became the final state to establish an independent 
legal ethics code.  See CAL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (2018); Elisa Cariño, The Golden Rules: A 
Primer on California’s New Professional Responsibility Rules, 8 NAT’L L. REV. 339  
(Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/golden-rules-primer-california-s-new-
professional-responsibility-rules [https://perma.cc/49SE-6UKF]. 
 52.   See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Pennsylvania Rules of  
Professional Conduct Relating to Misconduct, 46 Pa. Bull. 7519  
(Dec. 3, 2016), http://www.pacodeandbulletin.gov/Display/pabull?file=/secure/pabulletin/data/ 
vol46/46-49/2062.html [https://perma.cc/NW32-3U8M] (“Historically, Pennsylvania has supported 
adoption of ABA Model Rule amendments to promote consistency in application and interpretation 
of the rules from jurisdiction to jurisdiction . . . .”).  Other states may reject or modify ABA 
amendments.  
 53.   Before the ABA adopted Rule 8.4(g), 24 states had some form of anti-discrimination rule, 
and 10 of these appear to forbid discriminatory rejection of prospective clients.  Most of these rules 
are limited to “unlawful” discrimination.  See, e.g., IOWA RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 32:8.4(g) (2015); 
MINN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(h) (2015); N.Y. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2017); 
OHIO RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2020).  Illinois explicitly requires a court finding of liability 
for disciplinary action.  ILL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(j) (2015).  California previously had a 
rule that explicitly protected client selection, but has since required court adjudication.  CAL. RULES 
OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2-400 (2015).  Nine other states have anti-discrimination rules with general 
prohibitions that, as a matter of plain meaning, would seem to include client selection.  Twenty-six 
states had no black-letter rule prohibiting discrimination by lawyers.  Five states have considered and 
rejected Rule 8.4(g).  Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 8.4: 
Misconduct, ABA CTR. FOR PRO. RESP. POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM. (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_8_4.
pdf [https://perma.cc/HH4S-MARA].  
 54.   2015 ABA Memo, supra note 13, at 2.  
 55.   See id. at 5.   
360 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
A. The ABA Amendment Process and the Resulting New Model Rule 
8.4(g) 
The absence of a rule against discrimination in the ABA Model Rules 
was glaring, and there had long been efforts to address it.  In the 1990s, a 
push for an anti-discrimination rule failed to produce any black-letter 
prohibition.56  That was where things stood until 2015, when the new anti-
discrimination rule was proposed.  Concern and ambivalence about 
regulating discrimination in client selection surfaced early.  In the year 
between the committee’s first draft of the proposed rule and the final rule’s 
adoption in August 2016, the text changed three times, and each revision 
included language related to client selection.57 
In July 2015 the ABA Standing Committee proposed that an explicit 
prohibition on discriminatory conduct be added as a new section (g) of 
Rule 8.4.58  The first draft of the new section made it professional 
misconduct to “knowingly harass or discriminate against persons” on the 
basis of race, sex, or sexual orientation (among other characteristics) 
“while engaged [in conduct related to] . . . the practice of law” with no 
specific reference to client selection, which would seem to be included in 
“conduct related to . . . the practice of law.”59  An accompanying proposed 
comment asserted that the new rule would still allow “lawyers to limit their 
practices to clients from underserved populations as defined by any of 
 
 56.   Instead, in 1998, a comment to Rule 8.4(d), prohibiting conduct “prejudicial to the 
administration of justice” was adopted.  The comment explained that “[a] lawyer who, in the  
course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based 
upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic  
status” violates paragraph (d) “when such actions are prejudicial to the administration  
of justice.”  James Podgers, Proposed Rule that Makes Workplace Bias an Ethics Violation Not Going 
Far Enough, ABA President Says, ABA J. (Feb. 8, 2016, 8:31 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/proposed_rule_making_workplace_bias_an_ethics_violatio
n_doesnt_go_far_enoug [https://perma.cc/2EQT-G2GJ].  
  According to the Model Rules Preamble, however, “Comments do not add obligations to the 
Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules,” and “Comments are intended 
as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative.”  MODEL RULES OF PRO. 
CONDUCT Preamble ¶¶ 14, 21 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).  Supporters of an ethics rule barring 
discrimination therefore saw the anti-discrimination comment as a way to avoid addressing the issue 
“squarely, in the authoritative manner it would be if it were addressed in the text of a Model Rule.”  
Podgers, supra note 56 (quoting 2015 ABA Memo, supra note 13, at 3). 
 57.   See 2015 ABA Memo, supra note 13, at 6–7; Working Discussion Draft: Amendment to 
Model Rule 8.4 and Comment [3], AM. BAR ASS’N (July 8, 2015) [hereinafter July 2015 Discussion 
Draft], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/dra 
ft_07082015.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG53-ATBF]; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 
8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 58.   July 2015 Discussion Draft, supra note 57. 
 59.   Id.  
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these factors.”60 
Six months later, the draft released for public comment again made no 
reference to client selection in the black-letter rule.61  Again, a comment 
addressed the issue, but with a shift in emphasis.  Instead of approving 
client selection based on protected characteristics in order to represent 
“underserved” groups, the comment disavowed the new rule’s application 
to client selection altogether: “Paragraph (g) does not alter the 
circumstances stated in Rule 1.16 under which a lawyer is required or 
permitted to withdraw from or decline to accept a representation.”62 
As long as the exemption for client selection appeared only in a 
comment, while the proposed rule’s text barred discrimination in all 
“conduct related to the practice of law,” the overall effect remained 
ambiguous.63  The ethics committee of the ABA Business Law Section 
criticized the proposed amendment for “stating a black-letter principle in 
sweeping terms that the accompanying comment then purports to deny,” 
remarking tartly that “[p]erpetuating this kind of nonsensical self-
contradiction does little to promote respect for lawyers or legal ethics.”64  
In another writer’s view, the new black-letter rule appeared “to abrogate 
long-standing freedoms to decline or withdraw from representation as 
currently captured in Rule 1.16,” and the proposed comment would be 
“insufficient protection for the Rule 1.16 bases for declining or 
withdrawing from representation.”65  The ABA Standing Committee on 
 
 60.   Id.  Note that this early version of the ABA Model Rule is closer to the rule that this Article 
ultimately proposes.  Compare id., with infra Part III.B. 
 61.   2015 ABA Memo, supra note 13, at 2–3. 
 62.   Id. at 3.  The full comment did retain an oblique reference to underserved populations, but 
this time only in terms of ability to pay:  
 
Although lawyers should be mindful of their professional obligations under Rule 6.1 to 
provide legal services to those unable to pay, as well as the obligations attendant to 
accepting a court appointment under Rule 6.2, a lawyer is usually not required to represent 
any specific person or entity.  Paragraph (g) does not alter the circumstances stated in Rule 
1.16 under which a lawyer is required or permitted to withdraw from or decline to accept 
a representation.   
 
Id. at 2–3. 
 63.   Id.  
 64.   Letter from Keith R. Fisher, Chair, ABA Bus. L. Section Pro. Resp. Comm., to Myles V. 




 65.   Letter from April King to Myles V. Lynk, Chair, ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. 
Resp. (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional 
_responsibility/aba_model_rule%208_4_comments/king_2_14_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6YA-
3AS3]. 
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Professional Discipline worried that the comment did not go far enough, 
because it failed to “adequately recognize or articulate how the proposed 
Model Rule interacts with the longstanding principle that a lawyer has the 
broad discretion to accept or decline a representation.”66  The Discipline 
Committee therefore recommended moving the client selection exemption 
to the black-letter rule, suggesting text from Washington State’s anti-
discrimination rule: “This Rule shall not limit the ability of a lawyer to 
accept, decline or withdraw from the representation of a client in 
accordance with Rule 1.16.”67  In its final version, the new ABA rule 
closely tracks the Washington language.68  A new comment adopted with 
the rule further declares that lawyers may choose to limit their practice to 
“underserved populations in accordance with these Rules and other law.”69 
In sum, the new rule began as a general black-letter prohibition on 
discrimination with no exception for client selection and a comment 
approving preferences for representing “underserved populations.”70  An 
intermediate version retained the general black-letter prohibition, but 
added a comment disavowing the rule’s application to client selection.71  
The rule finally adopted in 2016 incorporates the disavowal in its black-
letter text, and restores the comment protecting practices limited to 
underserved groups.72  Based on a straightforward reading of the black-
letter text, supported by the legislative history, Rule 8.4(g) prohibits 
discrimination “in conduct related to the practice of law” but expressly 
declines to prohibit discriminatory client selection.73 
B. Other Professions’ Approach to Discrimination in Client Selection 
The legal ethics rule’s exemption for client selection runs counter to 
the approach of many other professions, which have not hesitated to 
explicitly prohibit discrimination against prospective clients or patients.  
The American Dental Association’s code of professional conduct declares 
that “dentists shall not refuse to accept patients into their practice or deny 
 
 66.   Letter from Arnold R. Rosenfeld, Chair, ABA Standing Comm. on Pro. Discipline, to Myles 




 67.   Id. (quoting WASH. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2015)).  
 68.   Compare MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016), with WASH. 
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2015).  
 69.   MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
 70.   July 2015 Discussion Draft, supra note 57. 
 71.   2015 ABA Memo, supra note 13, at 2–3. 
 72.   MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
 73.   Id. r. 8.4(g).  
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dental service to patients because of the patient’s race, creed, color, 
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin or disability.”74  
An ethics opinion of the American Medical Association explains that 
physicians must not “discriminate against a prospective patient on the 
basis of race, gender, sexual orientation or gender identity, or other 
personal or social characteristics that are not clinically relevant to the 
individual’s care.”75  Architects, engineers, social workers, psychologists 
and counselors all operate under codes of ethics that either forbid 
discrimination generally without any exception for client selection or 
specifically prohibit discrimination in client selection.76 
Indeed, when, in the spring of 2016, Tennessee passed a law 
purporting to insulate psychotherapists and counselors from liability for 
refusing to treat gay clients,77 the American Counseling Association 
declared it a direct violation of the counseling profession’s code of ethics 
and pulled the organization’s 2017 annual meeting from its scheduled 
Nashville location.78  There was national media coverage, with headlines 
like “Tennessee Lawmakers Just Passed a Bill that Would Allow 
Therapists to Refuse to Treat Gay Clients” and “Tennessee Governor 
Signs Discriminatory Law Allowing Therapists to Refuse Treatment to 
LGBTQ Patients.”79  So, while the ABA was in the process of adopting an 
ethics rule explicitly exempting lawyers’ client selection from anti-
 
 74.   PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS & CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.A (AM. DENTAL ASS’N 2018). 
 75.   CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS Op. 1.1.2 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2016). 
 76.   See CODE OF ETHICS & PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.401 (AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS 2020); CODE 
OF ETHICS FOR ENG’RS r. III.1.f (NAT’L SOC’Y OF PRO. ENG’RS 2019); CODE OF ETHICS r. 4.02 (NAT’L 
ASS’N OF SOC. WORKERS 2017); ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHS. & CODE OF CONDUCT r. 3.01 (AM. 
PSYCH. ASS’N 2017); AM. COUNSELING ASS’N CODE OF ETHICS r. C.5 (AM. COUNSELING ASS’N 
2014). 
 77.   TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-22-302 (2016).  The law was one of many such measures taken 
across the country in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s blessing of same sex marriage, and 
everyone understood that its primary purpose was to allow conservative Christians to refuse gay  
clients without fear of liability under civil rights law.  The ACLU called the law an “attack on the 
LGBT community” and a “free pass to discriminate.”  Kevin Lessmiller, Tennessee 
 Governor Signs Religious Counseling Bill, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Apr. 28, 2016), 
https://www.courthousenews.com/tennessee-governor-signs-religious-counseling-bill/ [https://perma 
.cc/76HH-93RR]. 
 78.   The American Counseling Association Will Not Hold Its Annual Conference & Expo in 
Tennessee, AM. COUNSELING ASS’N (May 10, 2016), https://www.counseling.org 
/news/updates/2016/05/10/the-american-counseling-association-will-not-hold-its-annual-conference-
expo-in-tennessee [https://perma.cc/SE5W-7HGJ].  
 79.   Eric Levitz, Tennessee Lawmakers Just Passed a Bill That Would Allow Therapists to Refuse 
to Treat Gay Clients, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 6, 2016), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/04/tennessee-
bill-would-let-therapists-reject-gays.html [https://perma.cc/9N9Y-2XT4]; Elliot Hannon, Tennessee 
Governor Signs Discriminatory Law Allowing Therapists to Refuse Treatment to LGBTQ Patients, 
SLATE (Apr. 27, 2016, 11:18 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/04/tennessee-governor-
signs-law-allowing-therapists-to-refuse-treatment-to-lgbtq-patients.html [https://perma.cc/G72F-
HHFH].  
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discrimination coverage, the American Counseling Association was 
reaffirming its rule forbidding client selection discrimination.80  One might 
wonder how it could be headline news for Tennessee to allow therapists 
to reject gay patients, but perfectly acceptable for lawyers to reject clients 
on the basis of race and sex.81 
Part of the answer must be that legal practice retains an aura of 
exclusivity that other professions renounced long ago.  One doubts that in 
the late twentieth century doctors would have proclaimed a prerogative to 
reject patients on account of race.  But according to Charles Wolfram’s 
Modern Legal Ethics, “a lawyer may refuse to represent a client for any 
reason at all,” including “because the client is not of the lawyer’s race.”82  
That classic text was published in 1986, more than thirty years after Brown 
v. Board of Education and more than twenty years after the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 made it illegal for hotels and lunch counters to turn away 
patrons on account of race.  Even among critics, lawyers’ privilege to 
discriminate is often described as the “traditional” view of legal practice.83  
What’s more, although most lawyers today would probably hesitate to 
broadcast race-based client choices, there seems to be no such 
compunction regarding sex.  In many states, law firms openly advertise as 
“divorce attorneys for women”84 and “divorce attorneys for men” and even 
explicitly “divorce for men only.”85  It is not surprising that Tennessee’s 
governor defended the state’s new law allowing therapists to reject gay 
 
 80.   See AM. COUNSELING ASS’N CODE OF ETHICS r. C.5 (AM. COUNSELING ASS’N 2014).  
 81.   See Gillers, supra note 7, at 201 (“[W]hy has the ABA, an organization of lawyers who are 
trained in drafting, had so much trouble writing a rule forbidding bias, harassment, and discrimination 
in law practice?”). 
 82.   CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 10.2, at 573 (Hornbook Series Student 
ed. 1986).  Wolfram served until 2000 as the Chief Reporter for the Restatement of Law for Lawyers.  
See Charles W. Wolfram Professional Biography, CORNELL L. SCH., 
https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/bio.cfm?id=183 [https://perma.cc/FY7J-4X9N] (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2021). 
 83.   See, e.g., Robert T. Begg, The Lawyer’s License to Discriminate Revoked: How a Dentist 
Put Teeth in New York’s Anti-Discrimination Disciplinary Rule, 64 ALB. L. REV. 153, 155 (2000) 
(discussing “the traditional view that lawyers need absolute discretion in client selection” and so are 
“‘above the law’ when it comes to discrimination in the selection of clients”). 
 84.   See, e.g., What Makes DAWN Different?, DIVORCE ATTY’S FOR WOMEN, 
https://womensrights.com/law-firm/what-makes-dawn-different/ [https://perma.cc/99CP-PBNT] (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2021) (a Michigan firm advertising online as “divorce attorneys for women”); 
HOFHEIMER FAM. L. FIRM, https://hoflaw.com/ [https://perma.cc/9EBN-4FTR] (last visited Jan. 23, 
2021) (a Virginia firm “representing women exclusively in divorce, custody and support”). 
 85.   See, e.g., THE FIRM FOR MEN, https://www.thefirmformen.com/ [https://perma.cc/PRR9-
J9P5] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021) (advertising as “the ONLY Family Law Firm in Virginia 
Representing Men Only!”); CORDELL & CORDELL, https://cordellcordell.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/6P4A-5QAX] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021) (a firm with offices in multiple states that 
identifies online as a “firm focused on men’s divorce and all other family law practice areas,” and “a 
partner men can count on”); DIVORCE FOR MEN ONLY, https://divorceformen.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/XN3L-FCUK] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021) (California firm).  
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clients by observing that “[l]awyers don’t serve everyone.”86 
C. Interest Convergence 
Both the Tennessee law and the new ABA rule were proposed and 
adopted around the time the U.S. Supreme Court declared that same-sex 
couples have a constitutional right to marry.87  After that decision, 
conservative organizations pushed back with impact litigation.  Across the 
country, lawsuits were filed on behalf of bakers, florists, and event spaces, 
contending that state laws requiring them to serve same-sex weddings 
violated their rights of free association, free expression, and religious 
freedom.88 
Some attorneys expressed similar concerns about the draft of the 
ABA’s proposed anti-discrimination rule, before the text excluding client 
selection was added.  One attorney contended that “gay individuals have 
deliberately sought out Christian bakers, wedding planners, 
photographers, etc., to force them to go against their consciences and 
religious beliefs to provide services,” and worried that others would 
“deliberately target lawyers who are devout Christians, or other more 
conservative or religious traditionalists in an effort to silence them for their 
moral stand and to force them from the practice of law.”89  Another wrote 
that imposing any constraint on lawyers’ ability to choose clients would 
be like “attempting to drag the ‘you must bake the cake!’ rule into the 
profession of practicing law.”90  The Christian Legal Society questioned 
the “wisdom of imposing a ‘cultural shift’ on 1.3 million opinionated, 
individualistic, free-thinking lawyers” and argued that the new rule “poses 
a real threat that lawyers will be disciplined for . . . their free exercise of 
religion, expressive association, and assembly.”91  The letter 
 
 86.   Steve Inskeep, For Tennessee Governor Weighing Religious Objection Bill, It’s All About 
Values, NPR (Apr. 21, 2016, 6:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/21/475026247/for-tenn-gov-
weighing-therapist-religious-objection-bill-its-all-about-values [https://perma.cc/2VWF-74E7]. 
 87.   See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).  
 88.   See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018) 
(considering a bakery’s challenge to Colorado public accommodations law on religious grounds).  
 89.   Letter from Michael P. Avramovich, Avramovich & Associates, PC, to ABA Standing 
Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp. (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_model_rule%208_4_comments/avra
movich_3_11_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4K2-VQ9V]. 
 90.   Letter from Daniel E. Garner to ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp. (Mar. 11, 
2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba 
_model_rule%208_4_comments/garner_3_11_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJZ8-Y9AX]. 
 91.   Letter from David Nammo, CEO & Executive Director, Christian Legal Soc’y, to ABA 
Ethics Comm. 3 (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
professional_responsibility/aba_model_rule%208_4_comments/nammo_3_10_16.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y8L6-L8KK]. 
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recommended adding a comment explaining that “declining representation 
based on religious, moral, or ethical considerations is not proscribed by 
this rule.”92 
Reading these submissions from the anti-discrimination rule’s notice 
and comment period, one might conclude that the exemption for client 
selection was driven only by pressure from a conservative wing.  But, as I 
have suggested, there is another constituency of lawyers whose practices 
were at stake.  Liberal cause lawyers did not argue against the new rule, at 
least not in any published comments, but in our anti-classification world, 
they might well have been concerned about a rule expressly barring 
discriminatory client selection. 
Some non-profit legal organizations make a deliberate choice to direct 
their services to members of historically subordinated groups in an effort 
to fight against what they see as persistent legal and social inequalities.  
So, for example, groups like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (NAACP-
LDF), Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
(MALDEF), National Organization for Women Legal Defense and 
Education Fund (NOWLDEF) and GLTBQ Legal Advocates & Defenders 
(GLAD) all focus their services on causes that are in part identified with 
particular groups defined by race, gender, ethnicity and sexual 
orientation.93  To be sure, none of these organizations have a categorical 
policy of exclusively representing only members of any one group defined 
by protected characteristics.  But they may consider an individual’s 
identification with one or more such group when they select clients.  
Likewise, some attorneys in private practice consider prospective clients’ 
race or sex in an effort to direct their services toward groups they perceive 
as having been denied equal legal rights.  Indeed, that was Massachusetts 
attorney Judith Nathanson’s reason for representing only women in 
divorce cases.94 
A legal ethics rule understood and enforced as a rule against 
 
 92.   Id. at 14. 
 93.   Our Impact, NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://www.naacpldf.org/naacp-mission/ 
[https://perma.cc/LH7H-PC5G] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021); Public Policy, MEXICAN AM. LEGAL DEF. 
& EDUC. FUND, https://www.maldef.org/public-policy/ [https://perma.cc/NM7K-RKL8] (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2021); Legal Impact, WOMEN’S LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, 
https://www.legalmomentum.org/our-legal-impact [https://perma.cc/PN3A-53WV] (last visited Jan. 
23, 2021); Our Impact, GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCS. & DEFS., https://www.glad.org/our-impact/ 
[https://perma.cc/XX4X-ZXX7] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).  
 94.   Nathanson v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, 
at *1 n.1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2003).  Likewise, the firms that target their services today to men 
in custody cases often express—and advertise—a belief that men are at a disadvantage in some family 
law matters.  See, e.g., THE FIRM FOR MEN, supra note 85 (stating that men are “traditionally 
disadvantaged in the court system”); CORDELL & CORDELL, supra note 85 (advertising its “dedication 
to leveling the playing field for men in family law cases”). 
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considering race, gender or sexual orientation in client selection turns all 
these lawyers’ efforts at social justice into ethics violations.  And that is 
unfortunately how an anti-discrimination rule is likely to be understood 
and enforced in our current legal culture.  Exempting client selection from 
the anti-discrimination rule thus protects two groups whose political 
interests often diverge: conservative lawyers who wish to avoid 
representing LGBTQ clients they regard as immoral, and progressive 
lawyers who want to focus their efforts on clients from groups they view 
as unfairly denied legal rights.  Indeed, Rule 8.4(g) could be seen as a kind 
of negative example of Derrick Bell’s “interest convergence” theory.95  
Bell posits that legal doctrines that promote equality for subordinated 
groups will be developed only in ways that converge with the interests of 
dominant groups.96  Progressive lawyers would ordinarily champion anti-
discrimination measures.  But in this case, they would have a reason to 
join with conservatives in opposing those regulations that would limit their 
ability to make race- and sex-conscious client choices. 
II. IS A LEGAL ETHICS RULE BARRING CLIENT SELECTION 
DISCRIMINATION DESIRABLE? 
If an ethics rule expressly barring client-selection discrimination could 
harm some worthy legal practices, perhaps the ABA is right to do without 
it.  After all, client-selection discrimination has not received much 
attention.  Despite a wealth of studies on Americans’ “access to justice,” 
there is very little empirical data on how race, gender, or sexual orientation 
affects access to legal representation.97  A 2008 article concluded that 
“[n]o major qualitative study has focused expressly on race and disputing, 
justiciable problems, or contact with civil courts or staff.”98  To my 
knowledge, no wide-ranging subsequent studies have been done since.  
Moreover, some ethicists take the position that regulating lawyers’ client 
selection would be a violation of lawyers’ and clients’ rights of free 
association under the First Amendment.99 
 
 95.   Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“[R]acial equality will be accommodated only when it converges 
with the interests of whites.”). 
 96.   See id.  
 97.   Note that most studies have differentiated based on socioeconomic status, not race.  See, 
e.g., The Justice Gap: Measuring the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-income Americans, LEGAL 
SERVS. CORP. 28–36 (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-
FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/93QX-S2ZK]; Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to What?, 148 
DAEDALUS 49, 49–51 (2019). 
 98.   Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice, supra note 28, at 350.  
 99.   See, e.g., TARKINGTON, supra note 46, at 270–75. 
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A. Is Client Selection Discrimination a Problem? 
It seems clear from the comments filed with the ABA, and from the 
firms advertising online as “Family Law Attorneys for Men” and “1-866-
DADS-LAW,” that some lawyers claim the right to exclude clients on the 
basis of sex.100  But they may be outliers.  Moreover, whatever one thinks 
of the principles on which these lawyers wish to base their client selection, 
at least there are principles at stake.  One might still imagine that lawyers’ 
client selection is relatively free of stigmatic bias based on race and sex.  
But there are reasons to doubt this rosy picture. 
There is a great deal of evidence that lawyers’ negative race and sex 
stereotypes affect their behavior in other contexts.  People of color, women 
and LGBTQ individuals are underrepresented on the bench, in legal 
practice, and in legal academia.101  As Deborah Rhode points out, law is 
even less diverse than other professions.102  While 72% of physicians and 
surgeons are White, that number is 88% for lawyers.103  Thirty-eight 
percent of lawyers are women.104  And the problems do not end with 
simple under-representation.  African American and women lawyers are 
less likely than White men with comparable credentials to reach the most 
highly paid, high status, high visibility positions in the legal profession.105  
“In major law firms, only 3 percent of associates . . . are African 
Americans.”106  “[B]lacks, Latinos, Asian Americans and Native 
Americans” together “make up fewer than 7 percent of law firm 
partners.”107  Women in law firms are “less likely to make partner even 
controlling for other factors, including law school grades and time spent 
out of the workforce or on part-time schedules.”108  Women of color are 
 
 100.   See, e.g., CORDELL & CORDELL, supra note 85. 
 101.   See, e.g., ABA National Lawyer Population Survey: 10-Year Trend in Lawyer 
Demographics, AM. BAR ASS’N (2019), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/market_research/national-lawyer-population-demographics-2009-2019.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/HJL3-R7GS]; Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Gavel Gap: Who Sits in Judgment 
on State Courts?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 7–12 (2016), https://www.gavelgap.org/pdf/gavel-gap-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K967-D6AL]; Meera E. Deo, The Ugly Truth about Legal Academia, 80 
BROOK. L. REV. 943, 947, 961 (2015).  
 102.   Rhode, supra note 29.  
 103.   Id.  
 104.   Jennifer Cheeseman Day, Number of Women Lawyers at Record High But Men  
Still Highest Earners, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 8, 2018), 
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/05/women-lawyers.html [https://perma.cc/PRF6-F4P8]. 
 105.   See Jeffrey A. Lowe, 2018 Partner Compensation Survey, MAJOR, LINDSEY & AFRICA LLC 
11 (2018) (finding that male partners at top law firms make an average of 53% more than similarly 
situated female partners). 
 106.   Rhode, supra note 29.  
 107.   Id. 
 108.   Id. 
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the most underrepresented at the top of the profession, making up just 
2.55% of law firm partners in 2015.109 
These disproportions are accompanied by qualitative evidence of both 
structural and personal bias.  A 2018 survey of nearly 3,000 in-house and 
law firm attorneys documents widespread experiences of bias.110  Women 
lawyers and lawyers of color report discrimination in hiring, performance 
evaluations, assignments, pay, and promotion.111 
The same law firms and individual lawyers accused of race and sex 
discrimination in their treatment of colleagues interact with prospective 
clients.  So assuming that the legal profession is devoid of discriminatory 
conduct toward prospective clients entails a belief that lawyers somehow 
turn on and off their discriminatory attitudes depending on the context, 
burdening their professional colleagues and employees but not the 
individuals who come seeking professional services.  That scenario is 
unlikely enough to trouble assumptions that lawyers’ client selection 
practices are free of bias. 
Even if there is always some lawyer willing to take a case, if 
prospective clients face discrimination, that surely will discourage their 
pursuit of legal counsel.  In any case, it is too soon to conclude that no 
problems of access exist. A few studies of particular types of legal cases 
suggest underrepresentation along race and gender lines, at least in some 
areas.  One by Amy Myrick et al. reports racial imbalance in legal 
representation of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases.112  Using 
a sample of over 2,000 cases from federal courts, the study’s authors found 
that African Americans are more than twice as likely as Whites to lack 
lawyers for the employment discrimination claims they take to court.113  
The authors conclude that “race operates in complex ways, both for 
 
 109.   Liane Jackson, Minority Women Are Disappearing from BigLaw—and Here’s Why, 
ABA J. (Mar. 1, 2016, 12:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/min 
ority_women_are_disappearing_from_biglaw_and_heres_why [https://perma.cc/Q3AT-JFAT]. 
 110.   Joan C. Williams, Marina Multhaup, Su Li & Rachel Korn, You Can’t Change What You 
Can’t See: Interrupting Racial & Gender Bias in the Legal Profession, ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN 
THE PRO. & MINORITY CORP. COUNS. ASS’N 7–10 (2018), https://www.mcca.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/You-Cant-Change-What-You-Cant-See-Executive-Summary.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/58PL-G93J]. 
 111.   Id. 
 112.   Amy Myrick, Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Race and Representation: Racial 
Disparities in Legal Representation for Employment Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 705, 707–08 (2012); see also Mary Nell Trautner, Tort Reform and Access to Justice: 
How Legal Environments Shape Lawyers’ Case Selection, 34 QUALITATIVE SOCIO. 523, 529 (2011) 
(discussing how plaintiffs’ race can affect their “likeability” to juries and thus whether an attorney 
takes the case); Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
1263, 1278 (2016) (noting that a history of biased treatment in the judicial system made people of 
color less likely to seek legal representation due to a distrust of institutions). 
 113.   Myrick et al., supra note 112, at 709, 718. 
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minority plaintiffs seeking lawyers, and for the lawyers who decide 
whether to accept them as clients” and that “minority plaintiffs face many 
of the same barriers to obtaining legal resources as minority groups do in 
other social domains.”114 
The Myrick et al. study details lawyering approaches that make the 
client selection process susceptible to bias.115  Lawyers interviewed 
“claimed to have an ability to assess the merits of a case almost instantly,” 
an approach that, as the authors note, is known to increase the potential for 
unconsciously biased selection.116  “After the initial phone call, most 
plaintiffs’ attorneys said a large part of their decision whether to accept a 
client was based on her mannerisms or demeanor at the initial meeting.”117  
Or on something even more ineffable: One attorney explained that part of 
what he was looking for was “chemistry” between him and the client, 
asking “[i]s this somebody that you feel like you can work with? Are you 
able to communicate effectively with that person?”118  Another attorney 
said “if I personally don’t get a sense of the honesty of the person or if I 
don’t feel like what I’m hearing is what’s really there, I generally don’t 
get involved.”119  And one lawyer declared that she uses the “smell test”—
to decide whether the potential client has a “‘morally right’ conviction” 
that she has suffered discrimination or is just “trying to work the 
system.”120  Myrick et al. point out the potential for discriminatory racial 
effects “if lawyers tend to unfavorably assess the demeanor of minority 
plaintiffs, viewing them either as ‘difficult’ to work with, not credible, or 
unlikely to present well to a judge or jury.”121  They conclude that “lawyer 
screening practices may be vulnerable to racial bias.”122 
Civil rights claims filed against lawyers offer further evidence that 
some prospective clients encounter discriminatory receptions.  In a few 
cases, clients have sued lawyers under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racially 
 
 114.   Id. at 708. 
 115.   Id. at 742–50.  There is a large and growing body of scholarship indicating that  
many, perhaps most, people with no conscious racial animus carry unconscious racial biases.  And  
there is another large and growing body of work contending that this type of bias is particularly likely 
to operate in situations where a person is engaging in quick, intuitive judgments.  See Cheryl Staats, 
State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2014, KIRWAN INST. 24 (2014), 
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014-implicit-bias.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/ZZ8E-ZEL7] (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).  
 116.   Myrick et al., supra note 112, at 743–44.  
 117.   Id. at 744. 
 118.   Id. at 745. 
 119.   Id. 
 120.   Id. 
 121.   Id. 
 122.   Id. at 756. 
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discriminatory treatment.123  For instance, in Davis v. Fenton, an African 
American client alleged that a law firm had targeted advertising to recruit 
African Americans facing mortgage foreclosure and then offered her a 
retainer agreement “that was different in its performance, making, and 
conditions from contracts offered to white individuals.”124 
The claims in Davis point out that race and sex stereotypes need not 
lead attorneys to total exclusion, but might affect client choice, and result 
in different standards for acceptance of clients’ cases or offering different 
terms for lawyers’ services based on race or sex.125  A study of 163 divorce 
attorneys found that they often used fees to discourage clients they saw as 
problematic.126  Two thirds of the attorneys interviewed expressed no 
preference for men or women clients.127  Most of the remaining third 
strongly preferred women.128  Some offered feminist explanations, but 
others viewed women clients as easier to control.129 
A 2012 mail survey of bankruptcy attorneys suggests that race 
stereotypes might influence attorneys’ judgments of what legal claims 
they would be willing to pursue on behalf of prospective clients.130  The 
study by Braucher et al. surveyed consumer bankruptcy attorneys and 
found significant differences in the type of bankruptcy filings the attorneys 
recommended depending on the prospective clients’ race.131  When the 
hypothetical couple seeking representation were identified as Reggie and 
Latisha and said to attend an African Methodist Episcopal Church, the 
attorneys were much more likely to recommend that they file under 
Chapter 13, a more arduous and often unsuccessful form of bankruptcy 
relief, than when they were told the hypothetical clients were named Todd 
and Allison and attended a United Methodist Church.132  Moreover, the 
surveyed attorneys viewed “Reggie and Latisha” as having “good values” 
 
 123.   These cases were dismissed for various reasons, without discussion of § 1981’s applicability 
to the lawyer-client relationship.   
 124.   Davis v. Fenton, 26 F. Supp. 3d 727, 735 (N.D. Ill. 2014); see also Rhodes v. Fleming, No. 
1:13-cv-0165-SEB-MJD, 2014 WL 852747 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 4, 2014), in which a man who pled guilty 
and was convicted of criminal sexual misconduct sued his defense attorney alleging racially 
discriminatory treatment.  Id. at *1–2.  The district judge dismissed the § 1981 claim because there 
was no evidence that the lawyer acted with racial animus in representing the complaining client.  Id. 
at *2. 
 125.   See Davis, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 735. 
 126.   LYNN MATHER, CRAIG A. MCEWEN & RICHARD J. MAIMAN, DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK 
102–03, 196 (2001). 
 127.   Id. at 212–13 n.8. 
 128.   Id.  
 129.   Id. at 213.  
 130.   Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy 
Chapter Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 394–95 (2012). 
 131.   Id. at 419–20. 
 132.   Id. at 406–07, 419–20. 
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and being more competent when they expressed a preference for Chapter 
13, while attributing competence and good values to “Todd and Allison” 
when they preferred to file under the faster, simpler Chapter 7 process.133  
Braucher et al. comment that “it seems that the African-American . . . 
couple expresses good values by indicating they want to pay back their old 
debts by filing in Chapter 13; the white couple expresses good values by 
putting their desire for a fresh start above repayment . . . .”134 
Further large-scale research studies should be undertaken to discover 
racial differences in representation and whether law firm practices skew 
access to justice by race or other protected factors.  But if it isn’t an ethical 
violation to reject prospective clients on account of race or sex, why 
expend resources trying to discover and eliminate such biased behavior?  
The ABA rule’s exemption signals implicit acceptance of status quo 
structural and implicit bias in law firms’ client selection practices, or at 
least a belief that ethics rules cannot, or should not, address them. 
B. Public Accommodations Laws 
Some existing generally applicable laws against discrimination may 
already prohibit lawyers’ discriminatory rejections of prospective clients.  
The best-known anti-discrimination law regulating private businesses’ 
provision of services is Title II of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964,135 
but the statute limits its coverage to “establishments which serve[] the 
public,” including “any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which 
provides lodging to transient guests,”136 and courts have tended to read that 
list as exclusive.137  So the Act has generally been held to exclude retail 
stores, let alone professional services.138  Section 1981 of the Civil Rights 
 
 133.   Id. at 415–16. 
 134.   Id. at 416. 
 135.   42 U.S.C. § 2000a. 
 136.   Id. § 2000a(b). 
 137.   See, e.g., Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 433–34 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that a hair salon, because not listed under Title II as a place of public accommodation, was 
not subject to the Act’s prohibition against discrimination).  
 138.   By contrast, the most recently enacted federal public accommodations law, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), explicitly includes lawyers’ offices in its list of places of public 
accommodation.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).  But the ADA forbids only discrimination “on the basis 
of disability.”  Id. § 12182(a).  The ADA’s definition of lawyers’ offices as places of public 
accommodation figured prominently in the Massachusetts court’s decision to hold the feminist lawyer 
liable under state public accommodations law.  See Nathanson v. Mass. Comm’n Against 
Discrimination, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2003).  On the 
other hand, there is a plausible argument that the ADA’s coverage of lawyers’ offices is meant only 
to ensure access to the physical space, making it possible for prospective clients who are disabled to 
meet with attorneys, but not regulating the attorneys’ ability to select or reject clients based on their 
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Act of 1866,139 however,  occasionally grounds claims that professionals 
denied or provided inferior services for racist reasons.140  Arguably, § 1981 
forbids race discrimination by lawyers in client selection, although no 
court has ever so held.141  In addition, most states have “public 
accommodations” laws that have been more broadly construed.142  Under 
these statutes, businesses and organizations are forbidden to discriminate 
in their provision of services.143  All state public accommodations laws 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of race and sex, and 24 expressly 
 
disabled status.  The ADA’s definition of discrimination seems to support this view:  
 
[D]iscrimination includes . . . a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, 
practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with 
disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would 
fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations . . . .  
 
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).  
 139.   Section 1981 provides that:  
 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every 
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to 
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .  
 
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).  
 140.   See, e.g., Aghazadeh v. Me. Med. Ctr., No. 98-421-P-C, 1999 WL 33117182, at *1, *12 (D. 
Me. June 8, 1999) (denying motion to dismiss on claim that patients “suffered delays in and denials 
of medical care because the [hospital] did not provide services in their primary languages,” in violation 
of § 1981); Wheeler v. United States, No. 1:12-cv-00540-LJO-JLT, 2012 WL 1594148, at *3,  (E.D. 
Cal. May 4, 2012) (dismissing patient’s § 1981 claim that he had to wait to receive medical care at 
clinic because he is White under res judicata due to earlier decision finding lack of evidence of 
intentional discrimination).   
 141.   The only direct analysis of § 1981’s applicability to the lawyer-client relationship appears 
to be in a case involving a client’s termination of a lawyer’s contract.  Mass v. McClenahan, 893 F. 
Supp. 225, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  In that case, a lawyer sued his corporate client under § 1981, 
claiming that the client terminated his contract because of concerns about being represented by a “New 
York Jew.”  Id.  The judge held that § 1981 “undoubtedly reaches the attorney-client relationship.”  
Id.  Rejecting the client’s First Amendment arguments, the judge reasoned that while some lawyer-
client relationships might be constitutionally protected as expressive associations, an ordinary 
commercial representation did not involve a collaboration “to advance shared political or social goals,” 
nor was it “the kind of close personal bond with which the First Amendment is concerned.”  Id. at 230 
n.4, 231. 
 142.   Only five states do not—Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and  
Texas.  See State Public Accommodation Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES  
(Apr. 8, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-
laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/BFK2-A3UW] (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).  
 143.   See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(f) (West, Westlaw through 2020 L.2020, c. 136 & J.R. 
No. 2). 
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prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.144  While hotels, 
restaurants, and theaters are paradigmatic places of public 
accommodations, some states and municipalities have expanded the 
category to include businesses, organizations, and institutions providing 
professional services.145  The 2003 Massachusetts ruling against the 
feminist attorney appears to be the only application of state public 
accommodations law to a lawyer’s rejection of a client.146  A small body 
of cases suggests that state courts and legislators may be increasingly 
inclined to view professionals as subject to these laws.147  Some courts, 
however, would likely not view lawyers as providers of the sort of “public 
accommodations” that are the subject of those rules.148 
Even assuming that § 1981 and some state public accommodations 
laws apply to lawyers’ client selection, that does not obviate the need for 
an ethics rule forbidding discrimination.  Civil liability is not a substitute 
for professional ethics regulation, which aims at different goals, provides 
 
 144.   State Public Accommodation Laws, supra note 142.  All also prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of ancestry and religion.  Id.  Arguably, statutes that prohibit sex discrimination necessarily 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.  See Bostock v. Clayton 
Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (holding that the federal statute banning employment 
discrimination because of sex covers sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination).  Thus, 
even jurisdictions whose public accommodations laws do not ban sexual orientation and gender 
identity discrimination per se may wind up interpreting their statutes to cover such claims.  But that 
presents yet another issue that has been rarely litigated and would need to be established as a matter 
of statutory interpretation in every state.   
 145.   See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.) 
(stating that the state’s anti-discrimination prohibition applies to “all business establishments of every 
kind whatsoever”). 
 146.   Nathanson v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, 
at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2003).  
 147.   New York courts have held that dentists’ offices are places of public accommodation.  Cahill 
v. Rosa, 674 N.E.2d 274, 277 (N.Y. 1996).  The Michigan Court of Appeals found that a doctor’s 
refusal to provide fertility services to a single woman violated that state’s public accommodations law.  
Moon v. Mich. Reprod. & IVF Ctr., P.C., 810 N.W.2d 919, 925 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).  Rejecting a 
lower court’s “conclusion that a professional, such as a doctor, may reject a patient or client for any 
reason, including discriminatory animus toward a protected characteristic,” the court found that the 
state civil rights act “serves to prohibit doctors and medical facilities from refusing to form a doctor-
patient relationship based solely on the patient’s protected status.”  Id. at 923–24, 925.  The court 
reiterated that under the Michigan law doctors are not free to follow their “personal prejudices or 
biases and deny treatment to a patient merely because the patient is African-American, Jewish, or 
Italian.”  Id. at 925; see also Fiske v. Rooney, 663 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding 
that a hospital was a place of public accommodation covered by the state’s anti-discrimination statute 
and that an ER doctor’s denial of treatment based on a person’s HIV status could constitute unlawful 
discrimination). 
 148.   Illinois courts refused to extend coverage of the state’s human rights act to doctors and 
dentists.  See Baksh v. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 711 N.E.2d 416, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (dentists); Duffy 
v. Ill. Dep’t of Hum. Rts., 820 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (doctors).  But the Illinois state 
legislature responded by expressly broadening the state’s anti-discrimination statute to cover 
professionals, including lawyers.  775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-101(A)(6) (West, Westlaw through 
P.A. 101-651). 
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different remedies, and works through different processes.  The fact that 
lawyers are subject to civil liability for fraud has not obviated ethics rules 
that forbid assisting clients’ fraudulent schemes.149  Civil rights laws 
compensate victims while prospective client protection is a primary 
purpose of a professional ethics code, as is maintaining the integrity—and 
the reputation—of the profession, and, indirectly, of the whole legal 
system.150  There are significant enforcement differences as well.  Even if 
rejected clients knew or suspected that a lawyer refused to represent them 
for discriminatory reasons, damages in such claims would be hard to 
imagine, let alone calculate and prove.  State bar disciplinary committees, 
however, operate as independent investigators of professional misconduct 
without the need for proving damages.  And state courts can impose 
professional sanctions that are different from civil remedies, ranging from 
published criticisms to fines to suspension or disbarment.151 
C. Would an Ethics Rule Against Client-Selection Discrimination 
Violate Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights of Expressive 
Association? 
Someone might say that even if discrimination against people seeking 
legal representation is wrong, lawyers’ client selection should still be 
unregulated.  Unlike doctors or dentists, lawyers’ work is a matter of 
expressive advocacy, so one might argue that the choice of whom to 
represent should be protected by the First Amendment.  The Massachusetts 
court that found Judith Nathanson liable under a public accommodation 
law rejected that argument.152  But it is worth considering this basic First 
Amendment claim at some length.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop suggests the claim should not be lightly 
dismissed.153  Nevertheless, I predict that it would ultimately fail. 
Despite recognizing the special nature of lawyer-client relationships, 
in the 1980s, the Court upheld state regulation of lawyers’ 
communications with prospective clients against a First Amendment 
 
 149.   See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(d), 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 150.   See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 151.   See MODEL RULES FOR LAW. DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 10(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).  
 152.   Nathanson v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, 
at *4–7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2003).  
 153.   See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728 (2018) 
(observing that a public accommodations law forcing a baker to make a cake for a same-sex wedding 
might implicate “a line where the customers’ rights to goods and services became a demand for him 
to exercise the right of his own personal expression for their message.”). 
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challenge.154  With the narrow exception of politically motivated non-
profit litigation, a state is free to punish solicitation.155  In the employment 
context, the Court has held that law firms are subject to anti-discrimination 
regulation, presumably without exception for non-profit organizations.156  
The Court recognized that “the activities of lawyers may make a 
‘distinctive contribution . . . to the ideas and beliefs of our society.’”157  
Nevertheless, law firms could not use the First Amendment as a shield to 
protect discriminatory practices.158 
In one sense, upholding regulation of a law firm’s partnership 
decisions defeats a stronger expressive association challenge than any 
posed by client selection.  Most clients come and go.  Their pictures are 
not displayed on the firm’s website.  In some ways, however, representing 
a client is both a more personal and a more public association.  After all, 
partners do not necessarily learn the confidential details of their 
colleagues’ lives and then stand up in open court to advocate for them.  It 
is the expressive nature of this public advocacy, and of legal representation 
generally, that arguably makes lawyer-client relationships special in a First 
Amendment context.  The question is whether that expressive nature 
precludes anti-discrimination regulation. 
Since the civil rights revolution in the mid-twentieth century, the 
Court’s basic approach to First Amendment challenges to anti-
discrimination laws has been to distinguish protected expression from 
unprotected exclusion.  So, for example, when White parents challenged a 
ban on segregated private schools, the Court agreed that states could not 
prevent private schools from teaching that segregation was good.159  Even 
so, “the [p]ractice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions” 
was not protected.160  Advocating racial segregation and White supremacy 
 
 154.   Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1978) (holding that a state ban on 
solicitation was constitutional as applied to a lawyer who reached out to an accident victim inquiring 
if she wanted legal representation).  In a companion case decided the same day, however, the Court 
found that in the context of non-profit public interest litigation, lawyers’ client solicitation is part of 
“collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts” and “a fundamental right 
within the protection of the First Amendment.”  In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978) (quoting 
United Transp. Union v. Mich. Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971)).  The distinction built on a previous 
case, NAACP v. Button, decided during the heart of the Civil Rights movement, in which the Court 
explained that prohibiting public interest lawyers’ efforts to reach out to prospective clients amounted 
to curtailing “a form of political expression.”  NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). 
 155.   Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 458.  
 156.   Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 77–79 (1984) (holding law firms are not immune 
from Title VII by the nature of the organization and complying with Title VII does not infringe on a 
firm’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment). 
 157.   Id. at 78 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 431).  
 158.   Id.   
 159.   Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976).   
 160.   Id.   
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was not the same thing as practicing it.161  First Amendment arguments 
could not be used to repackage forbidden discrimination as protected 
expression.162  The Court cited the private school desegregation case when 
it held that law firms were subject to anti-discrimination employment 
regulation.163  The law firm’s free association defense was unavailing 
because, “[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a 
form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First 
Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional 
protections.”164 
Looking at the early public accommodations cases in historical 
context shows that those decisions compelled businesses to curtail conduct 
that expressed political, moral, and sometimes religious beliefs.165  
Consider the Pickrick Restaurant, owned by Lester Maddox, who believed 
integration was “ungodly, un-Christian, and un-American.”166  For 
Maddox, the mandate to serve African Americans compelled expressive 
conduct directly contrary to his personal and political views.167  As Linda 
McClain notes, along with the food, “Maddox also offered up ‘homespun 
political commentary’ through the voice of  ‘Pickrick,’ in ‘Pickrick Says’ 
advertisements in the Atlanta Journal Constitution.”168  The restaurant’s 
gift shop sold pick handles (or, ax handles), then a notorious symbol of 
segregationist ideology because of their use as weapons by White 
supremacist mobs.169  Maddox sometimes autographed these “Pickrick 
drumsticks.”170  Without a doubt, serving an exclusively White clientele 
was an expressive performance of Maddox’s White supremacist politics.  
Nevertheless, a federal court ordered Maddox to desegregate and 
threatened him with a contempt conviction if he continued to exclude 
 
 161.   See id.   
 162.   See id. at 175–76.  
 163.   Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78 (citing Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176) (“There is no constitutional right, 
for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union.”).   
 164.   Id. (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)).   
 165.   See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per curiam) (calling 
restaurant owner’s free exercise defense to forced integration “patently frivolous”).   
 166.   Richard Severo, Lester Maddox, Whites-Only Restaurateur and Georgia Governor, Dies at 
87, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/25/us/lester-maddox-whites-
only-restaurateur-and-georgia-governor-dies-at-87.html [https://perma.cc/6GTD-RAHT].   
 167.   See Linda C. McClain, Involuntary Servitude, Public Accommodations Laws, and the 
Legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 71 MD. L. REV. 83, 89 (2011).  
 168.   Id. (quoting Justin Nystrom, Lester Maddox (1915–2003), NEW GA. ENCYC. (Apr. 20, 
2004), https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/lester-maddox-1915-2003 
[https://perma.cc/63Q5-FQVX]). 
 169.   Severo, supra note 166; see also Dierdre Conner, Ax Handle Saturday, 1960: A Day of 
Defiance in Black and White, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Aug. 22, 2010, 12:21 AM), 
https://www.jacksonville.com/article/20100822/NEWS/801246165 [https://perma.cc/Y2PT-ZMXQ].   
 170.   Severo, supra note 166.   
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African American customers.171 
Indeed, the Court’s public accommodations opinions stress the 
expressive effects of practicing and prohibiting racial exclusion.172  
Beyond making services available to African Americans, the Civil Rights 
Act’s “fundamental object . . . was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of 
personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public 
establishments.’”173  As Justice Goldberg put it, the injury public 
accommodation laws redress “is the humiliation, frustration, and 
embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is told that he is 
unacceptable as a member of the public” because of his membership in a 
stigmatized group.174  Thus desegregation was always understood to forbid 
an expressive performance of racial hierarchy.  Making businesses serve 
customers without regard to race was understood to force service providers 
to perform their customers’ dignity and equal membership in the 
“public.”175  Likewise, a 1980s decision forcing the national Jaycees Club 
to admit women on equal terms with men acknowledged that it restricted 
the Club’s right to expressive conduct.176  Nevertheless, because 
discrimination causes “unique evils,” the Court held that a state has the 
power to prevent discriminatory exclusion just as government can prohibit 
“violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce 
special harms distinct from their communicative impact.”177 
Because these early decisions so clearly implicate forced expressive 
messages and associations, it should be hard, going forward, to claim an 
exemption from anti-discrimination regulation, even for associations that 
obviously have expressive value.  But the Court has subsequently 
recognized such exceptions.  In 1995, the Court held that requiring a St. 
Patrick’s Day parade to include marchers who aimed to “express pride in 
their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals” 
violated the parade organizers’ First Amendment rights.178  A parade is an 
 
 171.   See McClain, supra note 167, at 90–91.  Maddox’s case was paired with that of a 
segregationist motel owner, who likewise was ordered to integrate and appealed the ruling to the 
Supreme Court and lost.  See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 242 (1964). 
 172.   See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976).   
 173.   Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250 (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 2370 (1964)).   
 174.   Id. at 292 (Goldberg, J., concurring).   
 175.   See id.   
 176.   Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622–23 (1984).   
 177.   Id. at 628.   
 178.   Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 559, 561 (1995).  
The Massachusetts public accommodations law the parade organizers violated is the same law under 
which the feminist attorney Judith Nathanson was held liable for rejecting a male client.  See MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 226 of the 2020 2d Ann. Sess.); Nathanson 
v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, at *1 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Sept. 16, 2003).   
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unusually, perhaps uniquely, difficult context in which to separate 
expression and exclusion.179  So the state’s forced accommodation of the 
gay pride marchers was an extraordinarily direct and specific intervention 
in expressive activity, and the decision condemning the regulation initially 
could be thought limited to its facts.  Then, five years later, the Court ruled 
that a state could not constitutionally require the Boy Scouts to accept a 
gay assistant scoutmaster.180  There, the Court effectively held that simple 
discriminatory exclusion could be a form of expressive association 
protected by the First Amendment.181 
Fast forward to 2015, when the ABA began considering its anti-
discrimination rule.  At the time, conservative groups were pushing back 
against the series of U.S. Supreme Court opinions leading to Obergefell’s 
recognition that year of same-sex partners’ constitutional right to marry.182  
Some groups filed constitutional claims on behalf of caterers, florists, 
photographers, and bakers who refused to serve same-sex weddings and 
were found to have violated state public accommodations laws.183  When 
one case, Masterpiece Cakeshop, reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 2018, 
it was decided on narrow fact-specific grounds, leaving the central First 
Amendment issues unresolved.184  The Court’s opinion is nevertheless 
revealing.185  Pointing to a canonical civil rights era public 
accommodations case, the Court reaffirmed the basic commitment to 
distinguishing discriminatory exclusion from discriminatory 
 
 179.   See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568–70.   
 180.   Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000).   
 181.   Id. at 648.  The Court differentiates this case from Roberts unpersuasively and does not 
mention Runyon, the decision holding that private schools may not exclude African American 
students.  Id. at 657–59.  Notably, Justice Stevens cites Runyon in dissent.  Id. at 678 n.10 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting).  In light of those omissions, it is hard not to view Boy Scouts as at least partly a product 
of the legally validated stigmatization of LGBTQ Americans.  At the time, states were free to 
criminalize same sex intimacy with the Supreme Court’s approval.  See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  The “principle” driving the 
results in Hurley and Boy Scouts may not have been expressive association beats anti-discrimination, 
but rather gay people always lose.   
 182.   See Robert E. Rains, Icing on the Wedding Cake: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious 
Objections—Is There an Accommodation That Will Make Everyone Equally Happy (or Unhappy)?, 
42 VT. L. REV. 191, 215 (2017).  
 183.   Id. at 215–19 (discussing Knapp v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (D. Idaho 
2016); Gifford v. McCarthy, 137 A.D.3d 30 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); Elane Photography v. Willock, 
309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017)).  
 184.   See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) 
(noting that similar challenges “must await further elaboration in the courts”). 
 185.   The Court declined the Justice Department’s invitation to apply a heightened level of 
scrutiny to a civil rights dispute involving LGBTQ Americans.  See Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4004530, at *14–21.   
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expression.186  As a “general rule,” businesses and “other actors in the 
economy and in society” may not “deny protected persons equal access to 
goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable” anti-
discrimination law.187 
It may seem unlikely that situations involving wedding cakes and 
flower arrangements could have much to do with lawyers’ clients.  But as 
the conservative Christian lawyers foresaw when they wrote to oppose the 
ABA’s anti-discrimination rule, the connection is not as farfetched as it 
may appear.188  Lawyers would likely contend that a refusal to represent 
clients of a particular race or sex should be understood as refusing to 
express a particular message, rather than excluding members of a protected 
group.  Likewise, the baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop argued that ordering 
him to provide a cake for a same-sex wedding forced him to “use his 
artistic skills to make an expressive statement . . . in his own voice.”189  
The Court signaled some support for this argument, observing that “[i]f a 
baker refused to design a special cake with words or images celebrating 
the marriage . . . that might be different from a refusal to sell any cake at 
all.”190  A lawyer has a persuasive argument that, in taking on any new 
client’s case, she is engaging to craft a custom-made expressive message 
to advance that particular client’s cause.  Even if a new client’s case is 
similar to previous cases, it will at least entail reshaping arguments to fit 
the new facts.191 
As the state argued in Masterpiece Cakeshop, however, even if a 
service is genuinely expressive, regulation only offends First Amendment 
principles if it affects the service provider’s “own message.”192  That 
depends largely on whether observers are reasonably likely to believe the 
message or association reflects the views of the person being compelled to 
 
 186.   Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 
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segregated restaurant owner’s free exercise defense for defying public accommodations law.  390 U.S. 
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 189.   Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728.   
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Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371–76 (2018). 
 192.   See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4004530, at 
*14–21, 30.   
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associate.193  In Hurley, the Court explained that everything in a parade is 
generally understood to be part of the parade organizers’ communication 
on their own behalf.194  So, forcing the parade to accept gay-pride marchers 
changed the expressive message attributed to the parade organizers.195  In 
contrast, for a law school allowing military recruiters, or a shopping center 
allowing political protesters, “there was little likelihood that the views of 
those engaging in the expressive activities would be identified” with the 
proprietors.196  Like a parade, legal advocacy is inherently expressive in 
the sense that its raison d’etre is communicating messages.  Still, 
regulating lawyers’ choice of clients may not trigger the same 
constitutional concerns as requiring parade organizers to include marchers 
if lawyers’ choices to advocate for certain clients are not widely 
understood as expressing the lawyers’ own world view.197 
An aspect of the attribution question is whether the person compelled 
to associate remains free to express disagreement with any message of 
approval or affiliation that the enforced association might send.198  Citing 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s observation that a shopping center could put up 
signs disclaiming its endorsement of the messages handed out by 
leafletters on the premises, the lower court’s decision in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop pointed out that “the bakery remains free to disassociate itself 
from its customers’ viewpoints.”199  While the public accommodations 
statute would prohibit the bakery from putting up a sign refusing to 
provide cakes for same-sex marriages, it would “not prevent Masterpiece 
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from posting a disclaimer in the store or on the Internet indicating that the 
provision of its services does not constitute an endorsement or approval of 
conduct protected by” the Colorado civil rights statute.200 
In one sense this is a circular argument.201  The fact that someone who 
loses her First Amendment claim that she has a right to refuse an 
association can say that she was legally compelled to associate is not an 
argument that some pre-existing legal authority permits or requires the 
government compulsion.  Put another way, the First Amendment does not 
say Congress can make any law it chooses compelling speech, so long as 
the speakers are free to announce that the government is making them do 
it.  As Justice Thomas observed, “[t]his reasoning . . . would justify 
virtually any law that compels individuals to speak.”202 
Nevertheless, legal decisionmakers do consider the pragmatic effects 
of a given outcome.  In weighing the social impact of a ruling that compels 
association, it seems relevant if speakers can effectively distance 
themselves from any message the association expresses.203  Here, lawyers 
are something of a special case.  While a lawyer’s personal opposition to 
her clients’ views may be well recognized, professionally lawyers are 
expected to be consistently loyal to their clients’ interests.204  A lawyer 
can’t walk out onto the courthouse steps and say, “actually, I don’t believe 
a thing I said in court today; personally, I think he’s guilty.” 
But ultimately that may not matter.  Lawyers are traditionally, almost 
definitionally, understood to be delivering messages they do not 
themselves believe.  A lawyer literally advocates “in his own voice,” and 
his arguments are “of his own creation.”205  But it’s well known that 
lawyers advocate for clients’ interests and goals, with which they 
personally disagree, and, for that matter, on behalf of clients they do not 
personally like or respect.  As the Massachusetts court explained in 
rejecting Judith Nathanson’s First Amendment claim, an attorney 
“operates more as a conduit for the speech and expression of the client, 
rather than as a speaker for herself.”206  Authentic self-expression is 
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exactly what is missing from a lawyer’s advocacy.  Arguably, that absence 
of self-expression is part of what makes it legal advocacy.207  When 
lawyers speak as lawyers, their audience views that expression through a 
lens of double consciousness, taking in their speech and associations as if 
they were sincere, while at the same time recognizing that they are “hired 
guns,”208 who can never be assumed to be voicing their own authentic 
opinions.  Indeed, compared with the political messages sent by segregated 
restaurants in the South in the 1960s, most lawyers’ client lists seem quite 
unexpressive of the lawyer’s own views. 
Accordingly, in my view, an ethics rule forbidding discrimination in 
client selection should and would survive a challenge based on lawyers’ 
freedom of association.  It is possible that the Court would declare that a 
lawyer’s choice of clients, like a parade’s choice of marchers, is itself the 
sort of sincere personal expression that should be free from rules that 
ordinarily forbid discrimination.  But the better—and more likely—
approach would rely on the early public accommodations cases’ 
distinction between exclusion and expression to protect prospective clients 
from discrimination.  Lawyers’ traditional role as “neutral partisans” who 
advocate for clients and positions they may personally deplore supports 
that basic divide.  Accordingly, although the First Amendment protects 
lawyers’ right to advocate for discriminatory people and policies, it also 
allows states to prevent lawyers from practicing discriminatory exclusion.  
Under that analysis, states could prohibit discriminatory client selection. 
III. CRAFTING AN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION RULE 
Assuming that anti-discrimination regulation of lawyers’ client 
selection is ethically necessary, practically beneficial, and constitutionally 
acceptable, how should it be shaped? 
A. The Anti-Classification Approach to Client Selection Discrimination 
These days, anti-discrimination laws are often interpreted as anti-
classification rules.  They are understood to forbid decision making based 
on race or sex, regardless whether those decisions work to perpetuate or to 
destabilize existing hierarchies.  Thus, Stephen Gillers explains that 
applying ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) to lawyers’ client selection would 
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outlaw Judith Nathanson’s refusal to represent men in divorce cases.209  
“She will reject—and therefore discriminate against—prospective male 
clients because of their sex.”210  For Gillers, to the extent that effect is 
problematic, it is outweighed by the rule’s protection for vulnerable 
prospective clients and the legitimacy of the legal system.211  As he puts 
it, “there is a supervening value in having a system of laws where no 
person can be denied representation . . . because of the person’s 
membership in one of the protected groups.”212 
Another well-known ethics scholar has directly advocated an anti-
classification approach to client selection.  David Wilkins has written in 
depth, and critically, on the problematic mainstream assumption that 
lawyers’ racial or gender identity should be irrelevant to their professional 
choices.213  When it comes to a lawyer’s choice of legal partners, Wilkins 
objects to a one-size-fits-all, anti-classification approach.214  He observes 
that “minority law firms, like historically black educational institutions, 
arguably provide a valuable service by creating a supportive environment 
in which some African-American professionals are more likely to 
thrive.”215  In contrast, large all-White firms both deny opportunities to 
underrepresented groups and “reinforce stereotypes of racial 
inferiority.”216  For Wilkins, those realistic differences mean that race-
conscious hiring and partnership decisions in these different contexts are 
ethically different, and should be treated differently.217  Nevertheless, he 
concludes that choosing clients on the basis of race is simply antithetical 
to the legal “profession’s commitment to ‘equal justice under law.’”218 
Wilkins argues that lawyers’ professional duty to serve equal justice 
is undermined if they “systematically refuse to represent individuals on 
the basis of considerations that have nothing to do with either their moral 
worth as human beings or the legitimate interest of attorneys.”219  At first, 
that characterization seems potentially to allow for prioritizing 
representing members of groups that have been disadvantaged in the legal 
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system.  Arguably, a choice to represent exclusively members of a 
historically subordinated group is a vindication of those prospective 
clients’ moral worth, and a legitimate, indeed an admirable, professional 
goal.  But Wilkins apparently rejects this view.  His primary example of 
forbidden client selection discrimination is an African American civil 
rights attorney who “is committed to using her legal talents to assist the 
black community and therefore does not represent whites.”220  Ultimately, 
then, both Gillers and Wilkins advocate an anti-classification approach to 
ethical client selection.  They would forbid race- and sex-conscious client 
choices across the board, whether those choices spring from personal bias 
and perpetuate stereotypes of inferiority or are principled attempts to 
prioritize advocacy for groups an attorney believes have been 
disadvantaged in the legal system. 
I agree with Gillers and Wilkins that prohibiting discrimination in 
client selection is justified, indeed demanded, by the legal system’s 
existential mandate to aim for equal justice under law.  But I do not agree 
with barring all race- or sex-conscious client selection, regardless of its 
purpose or effects.  In the following sections of this article, I propose a 
different approach. 
B. Ruling Out Stigma and Stereotype while Permitting Intentional 
Group Advocacy 
I start from a basic policy goal: to outlaw exclusion that perpetuates 
demeaning race and sex stereotypes, while allowing lawyers to consider 
clients’ race and sex in order to focus on vindicating the rights of 
individuals subject to just this kind of stigmatic prejudice.  We know the 
difference between someone who is making categorical group-based 
judgments in order to focus their work on just goals and someone who is 
thoughtlessly allowing stereotypical biases to infect their judgment.  I want 
an anti-discrimination rule that recognizes that difference. 
I propose the following rule of professional responsibility: 
A lawyer shall not accept, decline or terminate representation of a client 
on the basis of stereotypes, stigma, or bias regarding race or sex, but a 
lawyer may consider prospective clients’ race or sex in order to 
intentionally direct their practice toward serving underrepresented 
groups or toward dismantling race and sex hierarchies that frustrate 
access to equal justice under law. 
Under the ascendant anti-classification approach to discrimination, 
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my proposed rule would likely face additional constitutional challenges 
besides the basic First Amendment claim just discussed.  Doctrinally, 
these challenges would come packaged as claims that the rule classifies 
and intentionally disadvantages prospective clients on the basis of race or 
sex in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, 
and that the exemption for anti-hierarchical race- and sex-consciousness 
amounts to viewpoint discrimination forbidden by the First Amendment.  
I will address those claims separately, but it is important to see that both 
stem from the same basic question: whether the Equal Protection Clause 
presumptively forbids all policy distinctions based on race or sex or 
whether it mandates, or at least allows, government policies aimed at 
dismantling the kind of hierarchical social structures that precipitated its 
passage. 
Mainstream doctrine currently understands the Equal Protection 
Clause as a guarantee of formally equal treatment by government, even 
when a policy perpetuates or amplifies the White supremacy the 
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to undo.  The Supreme Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence forbids most government policies that classify 
individuals by race or sex, even when those policies reduce existing 
inequality.221  With that in mind, lawyers who wish to serve primarily or 
exclusively socially dominant groups (and prospective clients from those 
groups) might argue that my proposed rule treats individuals differently 
based on race and sex, and privileges the interests of those found to occupy 
allegedly subordinate places in society. 
For instance, the rule would allow Judith Nathanson’s practice of 
representing only women in divorce cases.222  As the Massachusetts court 
acknowledged, there was “no evidence of Nathanson’s improper animus 
towards men.”223  Nathanson chose to represent women exclusively not 
because she hated or disdained men, but because she wanted to use her 
practice to help women achieve equality.224  The court recognized that 
Nathanson “had earned a law degree with the purpose of helping to 
advance the status of women in the legal system, and her legal work had 
 
 221.   See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510–11 (1989) (invalidating 
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Supreme Court refused to apply a consumer fraud statute to lawyers’ conduct, explaining that through 
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 223.   Nathanson, 2003 WL 22480688, at *1 n.1.   
 224.   Id.   
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been devoted to that goal.”225  She chose to focus her limited resources on 
women in divorce cases, in an “effort to redress social and legal wrongs 
done to women.”226  Nathanson supported her argument that women faced 
ongoing inequality in divorce proceedings with a report on the 
Massachusetts judicial system showing that women remained 
disadvantaged in the state’s legal system.227  Arguably, then, her practice 
was intentionally directed toward dismantling a sex hierarchy that 
frustrated equal justice in her state.  So Nathanson’s practice would not 
violate my rule, although her client choices were based on sex. 
Similarly, a lawyer who wanted to represent exclusively African 
American clients in employment discrimination cases might point to the 
study by Myrick et al., finding that Black employment discrimination 
plaintiffs are disproportionately pro se,228 and argue that her race-
conscious client selection fell within the anti-subordination exemption.  In 
contrast, a lawyer who wanted to represent only White employment 
discrimination plaintiffs would be ineligible for the exemption unless she 
could present evidence that Whites are disadvantaged in that legal context.  
Likewise, if a family lawyer chose to represent only heterosexual couples 
in adoption cases, it is unlikely that she could show that heterosexuals are 
underrepresented or subordinated in the Massachusetts court system 
overall or in adoption proceedings there. 
The different results produced by my proposed rule could be 
challenged on constitutional grounds under an anti-classification theory.  
The lawyers who choose to represent only heterosexuals and Whites 
would contend that the rule enacts race and sex classifications and is 
motivated by intentional race and sex discrimination.  They might also 
argue that the rule amounts to viewpoint discrimination prohibited by the 
First Amendment, because it promotes an anti-hierarchical reform agenda 
and punishes lawyers and clients who wish to advocate conservative 
positions regarding racial and sexual politics.229 
 
 225.   Id.   
 226.   Id.   
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1. Equal Protection Arguments 
Under the prevailing approach to equal protection, predicating 
treatment on race or sex for any reason is suspect and “pernicious.”230  
Race and sex classifications are considered equally problematic whether 
they adversely affect members of historically subordinate or dominant 
groups.  So, “when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the 
basis of individual racial [or sexual] classifications,” heightened judicial 
review applies.231  In the context of race, courts apply “strict scrutiny,” 
which nearly always proves fatal to a race-conscious policy.232  In order to 
survive strict scrutiny, the challenged action must be “‘narrowly tailored’ 
to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.”233  Government policies 
that do not explicitly classify by race but which are undertaken with the 
intent of producing race-based results are likewise valid only if they serve 
compelling state interests while generating the least possible burden.234 
Arguably, the proposed ethics rule allows, or even requires, a state to 
engage in race-conscious decision making when adjudicating claims of 
discrimination against an attorney who refuses to work with certain clients.  
The rule forbids discrimination but exempts lawyers’ consideration of race 
or sex for the purpose of serving underrepresented groups or dismantling 
hierarchy.  So, if an attorney accused of discrimination rejected clients 
from a historically privileged group (e.g., White men), the attorney would 
have the opportunity to demonstrate that her decision was part of an 
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intentional effort to shape her legal practice to dismantle hierarchy.  If the 
attorney carries this burden, the state would not discipline her.  But if the 
rejected client is a member of a historically disadvantaged group in the 
relevant context, the attorney would be unable to show that she refused to 
represent this client in order to focus on remedying subordination, and she 
could be disciplined under the rule.  In effect, the argument runs, the rule 
makes the outcome of state ethics complaints hinge on the race or sex of 
the rejected clients.  It encodes an implicit classification and intentional 
state preference for groups historically disadvantaged by race or sex, i.e., 
Blacks, women, and LGBTQ Americans. 
To be sure, the rule has some potential defenses even within an anti-
classification system.  First, even practices that explicitly classify citizens 
by race are not always treated as the kind of government actions that 
trigger strict scrutiny.235  For instance, some race-conscious structures in 
our electoral system are accepted by the Court without subjecting them to 
heightened review.236  As Justice Kennedy noted in his Parents Involved 
concurrence, “[s]trict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting 
is performed with consciousness of race.”237  One could argue that the 
same reasons that apply in the electoral context make the anti-
subordination exemption constitutional in legal client selection.  Like race-
conscious but facially race-neutral district lines, the anti-subordination 
exemption allows individual actors in a governmental system to consider 
race in order to achieve an overall more just and equal institution. 
The proposed rule does not expressly single out one or another race or 
sex for beneficial treatment.  In the 1970s, the Supreme Court turned to 
purposeful intent as the sine qua non of discriminatory practices that do 
not facially classify by race or sex.238  Under the canonical Feeney case, 
knowing that a policy predictably will harm one race or sex is not 
sufficient.239  To violate equal protection, a policy must be enacted “at least 
in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 
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identifiable group.”240  Invalidating a facially neutral policy takes “more 
than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences,” it requires 
what my torts professor used to call “son of a bitch intent.”241 
The ultimate goal of the proposed ethics rule is not to privilege or 
disable legal representation of one race or sex, but to dismantle social 
hierarchies that leverage those characteristics.  So a state could argue that 
any resulting race or gender effects merely reflect the disparate impact of 
a race- and sex-neutral policy.  In Feeney, the Court upheld a state’s hiring 
preference for military veterans that disproportionately benefited men 
(greatly over-represented among veterans), even though government 
policymakers obviously knew that women would be disadvantaged.242  
Applying the same standard, the proposed anti-subordination rule 
arguably survives. 
Suppose a group of White men challenge the rule because they were 
turned away from a law office that represents only people of color.  Recall 
that the race-conscious intent of the private attorneys is not grounds for a 
constitutional challenge; the rejected clients must prove that the 
enforceable government rule of legal ethics that exempts their race-
conscious practices is itself discriminatory.243  The rule explicitly forbids 
discrimination against any prospective clients “on the basis of stereotypes, 
stigma, or personal bias” whether the would-be clients are White or Black, 
men or women, gay or straight.  And it allows race- or sex-conscious client 
selection only instrumentally for the purpose of supporting private conduct 
that aims to break down persistent hierarchies that frustrate equality in the 
legal system.  In line with Feeney’s reasoning, if the rule results in some 
White men being refused representation by certain law firms, that is 
merely a collateral effect that occurs “in spite of,” not “because of,” the 
rule’s purpose.244  Moreover, further proof of the rule’s race-neutral 
purpose is that in some instances it will benefit members of usually 
dominant groups.  White men will reap the benefits of the law’s 
exemption, for example, if the law firms that advertise as divorce attorneys 
for men can argue persuasively that men have been historically 
disadvantaged in custody cases. 
The counterargument is that, unlike the gender disparity in Feeney, the 
categorical effects of the anti-subordination rule are conceptually tied to 
the rule’s purpose.  Although gender inequality in society is doubtless one 
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reason why women are underrepresented among veterans, a veterans’ 
hiring preference would not necessarily hinge on gender to accomplish its 
goals.245  So the state could claim that the gender impact was an 
unfortunate side-effect, like the nausea that comes with a drug used to cure 
some unrelated illness.  In contrast, the proposed client selection 
exemption allows, or even promotes, race- and sex-conscious client 
choices in order to dismantle race and sex hierarchies. 
But this brings up a different defense of the rule’s anti-subordination 
policy.  In most jurisdictions, there is no shortage of attorneys available to 
represent clients of every race and sex so long as they can afford to pay.  
And no one is entitled to be represented by any particular attorney.  Just 
as a voting district may be redrawn to avoid diluting African American 
voting strength without diluting White votes, the rule allows lawyers to 
prioritize representing members of subordinated groups without 
preventing members of dominant groups from obtaining legal 
representation.  So the rule’s support of subordinated groups does not 
redistribute any substantial entitlements along the lines of race or sex.  As 
William Carter suggests, however, the real target of anti-classification 
doctrine may be governmental attention to race and sex and the 
communication of that attention.246  Arguably, race-conscious client 
selection is constitutional anathema for the same reason that Parents 
Involved struck down school districts’ use of race to allocate elementary 
school placements—its race-conscious expression.247  The proposed rule 
“tells each [client] he or she is to be defined by race” for the purpose of 
allowing or forbidding a law firm’s decision not to represent them.248 
The Court repeatedly declares that tangible burdens need not be 
imposed to make a race-conscious law suspect.  So, for instance, strict 
scrutiny applied to a law school admissions policy that considered “many 
possible bases for diversity admissions,”249 because “whenever the 
government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that 
person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and 
spirit of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection.”250  Still, as Reva 
Siegel and Jack Balkin point out, “the law covertly preserves” some 
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exceptions to this supposedly universal anti-classification principle.251  
When and how those exceptions will be recognized can be difficult to 
predict.  Surely, though, as Siegel and Balkin observe, courts’ responses 
have something to do with wider cultural expectations, and the perceived 
normalcy of different status-based practices.252 
It may be that anti-subordination client selection fits with implicitly 
accepted social practices.  One can find plenty of ads for “divorce 
attorneys for women” and “family law attorneys for men,” even in 
Massachusetts—despite the Nathanson decision!253  And note that the 
firms representing men expressly frame that choice as an anti-
subordination mission, talking, for example, about their “dedication to 
leveling the playing field for men in family law cases.”254  The founder of 
one such firm, Cordell & Cordell, explains, “[a]s a society we’ve made 
progress regarding gender in a number of areas, . . . [b]ut the dark corner 
of the room . . . is dads’ rights in family courts.”255 
A general survey of public accommodations caselaw is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but from a limited review it appears that “reverse 
discrimination” cases are rare.  Moreover, at least in some parts of the 
country, it is not uncommon to see services advertised as directed 
primarily, if not exclusively, to groups who have been excluded or treated 
as outsiders by mainstream providers.  Women’s gyms and social spaces 
that cater to African Americans and Asians are examples.256  It may be that 
despite the goose/gander mentality of recent civil rights doctrine, the 
general public, and some legal decision makers, tend to distinguish 
between exclusion that perpetuates stigmatic prejudice and efforts to 
provide safe space and services for individuals previously excluded by 
those stigmas.  In the rare legal challenges to these operations, they are 
 
 251.   Balkin & Siegel, supra note 15, at 19 (offering adoption decisions and census categories as 
examples).   
 252.   See id. at 25–26.   
 253.   See, e.g., Family Law Offices: Massachusetts, CORDELL & CORDELL, 
https://cordellcordell.com/offices/massachusetts/ [https://perma.cc/M8EE-GTCY] (last visited Jan. 
24, 2021) (“Our Massachusetts divorce lawyers focus entirely on men’s divorce, child custody, 
paternity, and other family law issues.”).   
 254.   CORDELL & CORDELL, supra note 85.  
 255.   Angelina Chapin, Dads’ Rights: The Rise of Firms for Fathers Going Through Divorce, 
GUARDIAN, (Oct. 15, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/oct/15/ 
fathers-rights-divorce-lawyers?CMP=share_btn_link [https://perma.cc/3X59-U8RX].   
 256.   See, e.g., CURVES, https://www.curves.com/ [https://perma.cc/5YAL-EZXU] (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2021) (advertising “Womens’ Health & Fitness Clubs”); Morgan Jerkins, ‘For 
Us, by Us’: Inside the New Social Spaces for People of Color, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/09/nyregion/social-clubs-nyc-people-of-color.html [https://perma 
.cc/T85T-YB34]; Alice Yin, A Pioneering Times Square Asian-American Nightclub Closes, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/style/circle-times-square-korean-
nightclub-closes.html [https://perma.cc/8AX8-7NSR].   
2021] LAWYERS FOR WHITE PEOPLE? 393 
sometimes defended, and sometimes survive, as providing for specialized 
needs or as otherwise distinguishable.257  When these practices hit the 
mainstream press, draw the attention of political opponents, and/or reach 
the highest levels of judicial review, however, the anti-classification 
perspective sometimes reasserts itself.258 
Once again, Masterpiece Cakeshop is illuminating.  The Colorado 
Civil Rights Division ruled that the baker who refused to create a cake for 
a same-sex wedding had violated Colorado’s public accommodations 
statute.259  In contrast, the Commission found that three other bakers “acted 
lawfully in declining to create cakes with decorations that demeaned gay 
persons or gay marriages.”260  The Colorado Court of Appeals 
distinguished those cases, finding that, rather than discriminating on the 
basis of sexual orientation or creed, those bakers had declined to make the 
requested cakes “because of the offensive nature of the requested 
message.”261  The U.S. Supreme Court’s majority opinion, however, 
treated the Commission’s differential holdings as evidence of official 
hostility toward conservative religious beliefs.262  In dissent, Justice 
Ginsburg pointed out that the bakers whose refusals were found to be 
legitimate had been asked to make cakes with explicit verbal or symbolic 
messages.263  These bakers would have refused to bake those cakes no 
matter who requested them.264  In contrast, the baker who refused to serve 
a same-sex wedding declined to provide a basic wedding cake he sold to 
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other customers, and did so because of the requesting customers’ 
identity.265  What is glaringly absent from any judicial opinion in this case, 
however, is the idea that different treatment might be warranted because 
one baker’s refusal of service reproduced the longstanding stigmatization 
and exclusion of a subordinated group, namely LGBTQ Americans, while 
the other bakers declined service precisely to avoid perpetuating that same 
stigmatic prejudice. 
In the current doctrinal setting, a state would have a hard time claiming 
that a general history of social subordination justifies using racial 
classifications to determine who gets legal representation.  The Court has 
explained that a showing of “[s]ocietal discrimination, without more, is 
too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy.”266  So, 
for instance, “a generalized assertion that there has been past 
discrimination in an entire industry,” could not legitimize requiring 
contractors hired by a city to subcontract 30% of their business to 
“minority” business enterprises.267  In order to justify remedial action, 
states “must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some 
specificity.”268  Still, in its most recent school desegregation case, the 
Court stopped short of holding that remedying pervasive structural 
inequality could not be a compelling state interest, with five justices across 
various opinions finding that it could.269 
It is also clear from the caselaw that racially equal results will not 
suffice as an end goal.  A thumb on the scale for one race or sex is only 
justified as a way to achieve some other policy goal.  As the Court 
explained, when upholding a law school’s race-conscious admissions 
policy, the use of racial or sexual classifications must be “part of a broader 
assessment of diversity,” or instrumental toward some interest other than 
racial equality, “not simply an effort to achieve racial balance.”270  Just as 
“attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the [l]aw [s]chool’s 
proper institutional mission,” diversity is crucial in a legal system.271  
Without culturally sensitive representation of all its citizens, a state’s legal 
system can never achieve its promise of “equal justice under law.”  In 
validating race-conscious admissions criteria, Grutter emphasized that the 
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policy produced substantial educational benefits for all students, 
“promot[ing] cross-racial understanding, help[ing] to break down racial 
stereotypes, and enabl[ing] students to better understand persons of 
different races.”272  Likewise, the benefits of a diverse legal system are not 
confined to members of disadvantaged groups who would otherwise tend 
to be excluded. 
The anti-subordination rule’s primary purpose is fulfilling the design 
of a state’s legal system.  In our common-law-based system, the facts and 
interests brought to courts by litigants shape the law that is applicable to 
subsequent cases.  In this way the law evolves to fit the society it regulates.  
In such a system, a failure of diversity distorts the law itself.  A state 
therefore has a compelling interest in ensuring that the circumstances, 
claims and interests of all kinds of people are fed into cases being 
adjudicated.  Otherwise courts cannot properly do their job of interpreting 
legal texts and doctrines in ways that accurately reflect and rationally 
regulate the dynamic, diverse society to which those laws apply.  
Arguably, this is not entirely a matter of underrepresentation by the 
numbers.  The anti-subordination rule encourages lawyers to build 
practices aimed at advocating points of view and promoting interests that 
tend to be sidelined, suppressed or simply overlooked because they belong 
to perennially subordinated groups. 
Moreover, the legitimacy and public acceptance of a state legal system 
depend on it being seen to intelligently and sympathetically represent such 
perspectives.  In Grutter, the Court explained that “[i]n order to cultivate 
a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary 
that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified 
individuals of every race and ethnicity.”273  If a law school has a special 
need for diversity in order to produce legitimate leadership, a legal system 
needs attorneys to represent subordinated interests in order to produce 
legitimate law.  If producing legitimate leadership means participation in 
law school by “[a]ll members of our heterogeneous society,” producing 
legitimate law requires that attorneys represent perspectives and interests 
that have traditionally been excluded.274  Consequently, just as state law 
schools may put a finger on the admissions scale to achieve diversity, state 
legal ethics rules may provide a narrow exemption to support private 
lawyers’ choice to prioritize representation of historically excluded 
groups. 
The Court has emphasized that “‘[c]ontext matters’ in applying strict 
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scrutiny.”275  Thus, a law school’s use of race in its admissions process 
was upheld in part because “the expansive freedoms of speech and thought 
associated with the university environment” give universities “a special 
niche in our constitutional tradition.”276  Likewise, the special 
“constitutional niche” of state legal systems, and their need for legitimacy, 
help to distinguish the Court’s cases invalidating racial preferences.  “[A] 
generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire 
industry” might not justify racial set asides for  building contractors.277  
But if concerns about the legitimacy of the country’s lawmakers can 
validate a public law school’s race-conscious admissions process, 
concerns about the legitimacy of a state’s legal outcomes can support a 
state’s choice not to shut down private law firms’ efforts to destabilize race 
and sex hierarchies that obstruct equal justice in the legal system. 
Finally, the rule allowing race- or sex-conscious client choices is 
narrowly tailored to its policy goal.  It does not require lawyers to give 
preference to clients from subordinated groups, or provide state funding 
for such a practice.  Nor would the exemption always legitimize rejecting 
clients from the same, generally dominant social groups.  In a given 
sociolegal context, representing members of an ordinarily dominant racial 
or sexual group might be covered by the rule’s exemption.  So, for 
instance, the “Divorce Attorneys for Men” firms might defend their sex-
based client selection practice by showing that in the jurisdictions where 
they work men are at a systemic disadvantage in child custody cases. 
One practical issue in administering the rule would be the production 
of proof that prioritizing clients of a given race or sex is reasonably related 
to the rule’s anti-hierarchical goal.  In order to justify remedial action, 
states “must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some 
specificity.”278  A concrete showing of prior discrimination by the very 
organization affected by the race conscious policy can justify imposing a 
racial quota.279  In contrast, “a generalized assertion that there has been 
past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a 
legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to 
remedy.”280  The problem will be identifying a target area in which race or 
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sex hierarchy persists.  The level of proof required should be calibrated to 
the relative strength and invasiveness of the challenged policy, and the 
rule’s exemption is a minimal intervention.  Protection for voluntary anti-
subordination practices is far from a racial hiring quota or race-conscious 
allocation of limited spaces in a coveted public school.  Indeed, the 
exemption imposes no positive duty to redress inequality.  It merely 
creates a small area of private liberty to avoid a state-imposed anti-
discrimination measure. 
Moreover, the exemption acts to address a reality of pervasive 
inequality that is widely recognized.  Although charged with assuring 
equal justice, most, if not all, state legal systems undeniably have a history 
of anti-democratic group subordination in substantive, procedural and 
cultural forms.  Substantive laws enforced racial segregation, denied 
property rights to women and people of color, and criminalized same-sex 
relationships.  Procedural rules prevented Black people and women from 
testifying and serving on juries.281  Moreover, as numerous studies show, 
the legal profession and the judicial bench continue to be 
disproportionately White, male, and heterosexual.282  A number of state 
and federal court studies have published evidence of race and gender bias 
in their jurisdictions.283  But is a state legal system localized enough?  A 
particular court jurisdiction?  Do we need evidence of bias in a particular 
area of law, for instance, police violence claims, employment 
discrimination, or child custody proceedings?  Certainly, the more tightly 
the area is defined, and the more concrete the evidence of bias, the more 
likely the rule’s application would survive an equal protection challenge. 
Considering what evidence would be needed to support an anti-
subordination exemption again points out the dearth of information about 
how legal representation varies by race and sex.  Although much attention 
has been paid to “access to justice” issues for impoverished and middle-
class Americans, and study after study reconfirms the persistence of race 
and sex biases in other aspects of the legal profession, there have been 
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almost no organized efforts to discover whether race and sex bias affects 
access to representation.  That information is sorely needed. 
The narrowness inquiry highlights the paradoxical effects of making 
states’ constitutional responsibility for equal protection a matter of 
avoiding all classification by protected characteristics.  The proposed rule 
allows race- or sex-conscious client selection by attorneys only to advance 
a targeted institutional practice aimed at reversing inequality.  In contrast, 
ABA Rule 8.4(g)’s exemption of client selection apparently permits 
attorneys to consider race and sex in all decisions about whom to 
represent, and to discriminate with impunity against any prospective client 
on the basis of racist and sexist bias and stereotypes.284  Yet the ABA rule 
would not face any significant equal protection challenge. 
In the current anti-classification regime, the cardinal sin is not policies 
that protect inequalities of race and sex, but rather race-conscious or sex-
conscious policy intervention for any reason—even to remedy those 
inequalities.  A rule that exempts all client-selection discrimination does 
not require government decisionmakers ever to consider race or sex in 
adjudicating legal ethics claims.285  In contrast, the proposed narrower 
anti-subordination exemption would require consideration of rejected or 
accepted clients’ race or sex, and of status differences by race and sex in 
the legal system.  Thus, an anti-subordination rule arguably requires state 
actors to “classify” some individuals by race or sex and so becomes 
vulnerable to constitutional challenges in a legal culture that interprets the 
guarantee of equal protection as a prohibition on government race and sex 
consciousness.  The bizarre result is that a rule that allows lawyers to 
engage in race- and sex-conscious decision making only in narrowly 
defined circumstances, and only to advance equal justice under law, risks 
being struck down as an equal protection violation, while a rule that allows 
lawyers to discriminate with impunity against clients on the basis of race 
and sex is immune from equal protection attack. 
2. Viewpoint Discrimination 
By no means would I predict that most legal decision makers today 
would endorse my proposed rule.  But it is possible to find a narrow path 
through which an anti-subordination exemption might survive an equal 
protection challenge, even in today’s doctrinal structure.  The very 
narrowness of the exemption, however, suggests another line of 
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constitutional attack that is still more threatening.  Assuming that the First 
Amendment generally allows anti-discrimination regulation of client 
selection (as argued in Section II), opponents of the proposed rule might 
argue that its anti-subordination exemption constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination.286  The proposed rule allows race- or sex-conscious client 
selection by attorneys who wish to turn their legal practices toward certain 
political goals, namely dismantling existing race and sex hierarchies and 
promoting equality.  But race- and sex-conscious client selection is not 
permitted for advocacy aimed at preserving hierarchical ideologies and 
structures, like White supremacy, male dominance, and heteronormativity.  
Arguably, that distinction unconstitutionally penalizes lawyers who wish 
to champion hierarchical ideologies.287  In other words, in an anti-
classification regime, anti-subordination is not only a disfavored approach 
to carrying out the Constitution’s equal protection mandate.  It is a 
“viewpoint” that government is forbidden to favor. 
“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”288  A regulation “motivated by nothing more than a 
desire to curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial 
issues of general interest is the purest example of a ‘law abridging the 
freedom of speech.’”289  Through an anti-classification lens, it looks like 
paradigmatic viewpoint discrimination to exempt considerations of 
clients’ race and sex in advocacy aimed at dismantling hierarchy, while 
omitting any such exemption supporting the hierarchical status quo. 
The anti-subordination exemption has some potential defenses against 
a viewpoint discrimination claim, even within the dominant anti-
classification framework.  First, a state might argue that the exemption 
does not actually burden any person’s rights.  Individuals seeking legal 
representation are not entitled to be represented by a particular lawyer or 
firm.  Lawyers are entitled to advocate for discriminatory structures and 
practices, but they are not constitutionally privileged to practice 
discrimination.  So the exemption does not deny any concrete entitlement.  
No harm, no foul.  Under the Court’s First Amendment caselaw, however, 
that argument is probably a non-starter.  No one is entitled to be exempt 
from paying taxes.  Yet the Supreme Court has held that conditioning a 
property-tax exemption on a loyalty oath amounts to unconstitutional 
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viewpoint discrimination.290  By analogy, an exemption from ethics 
sanctions conditioned on promoting race- or sex-equality coerces 
acquiescence to a favored viewpoint. 
In certain circumstances, however, government legitimately can 
reward one viewpoint and forbid or penalize another.  The “government 
speech doctrine” allows government policies that force government 
employees and others who are speaking for the government to promote a 
particular viewpoint.291  The Court has held that public funding can depend 
on carrying out the government’s chosen mission, including expressing a 
government preferred view (and refraining from promoting views 
government opposes).292  Thus, Rust v. Sullivan upheld a restriction 
attached to funding for gynecological care that prohibited doctors from 
counseling patients about abortion.293  The Court explained that the 
government was under no obligation to subsidize communication about a 
practice it opposed in principle.294  One might argue that just as a 
government “may validly choose to favor childbirth over abortion and to 
implement that choice” by withholding funding from doctors who discuss 
abortion, a state may support legal practices that work to increase the legal 
system’s structural equality and deny that support to practices that 
undermine that goal.295 
But using legal ethics regulations to support a government-preferred 
approach to social problems runs counter to the view that lawyers should 
be independent of government.  Indeed, the Court has held that restrictions 
on lawyers’ advocacy do not fit within the government speech doctrine.  
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court invalidated a restriction 
attached to legal services funding that forbade lawyers from challenging 
the constitutionality of state or federal statutes and thus “discourage[d] 
challenges to the status quo.”296  The Court distinguished Rust as involving 
a program in which “the government ‘used private speakers to transmit 
specific information pertaining to its own program.’”297  A lawyer, 
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however—even a legal services funded lawyer—“is not the government’s 
speaker,” but rather his client’s advocate.298 
To be sure, the anti-subordination exemption is a much weaker 
intervention in legal advocacy than the substantive ban invalidated in 
Velazquez.  But if opposition to existing race and sex inequalities is just 
one political “point of view” among many options, an ethics rule 
exemption that favors it is viewpoint discrimination.  Weak or not, the 
exemption can be cast as an illegitimate “attempt . . . to exclude from 
litigation those arguments and theories [the state] finds unacceptable but 
which by their nature are within the province of the courts to consider.”299  
In Velazquez, the Court explained that Congress was not required to fund 
any civil legal actions, but once such funding was provided, it could not 
be “aimed at the suppression of ideas.”300  Likewise, the argument runs, 
states need not prohibit client-selection discrimination at all.  But if they 
do prohibit race- and sex-conscious client selection, exemptions may not 
aim to foster political ideologies the state favors and suppress their 
opposition. 
Finally, perhaps the basic distinction between discriminatory 
exclusion and expression adopted in the early public accommodations 
cases offers some foothold against a viewpoint discrimination claim.  One 
could argue that the proposed rule’s exemption does not violate the First 
Amendment as viewpoint discrimination because the conduct that remains 
forbidden under the rule was not constitutionally protected in the first 
place.  But this argument runs up against another First Amendment 
precedent. 
In R.A.V. v. St. Paul, the Court struck down an ordinance that 
criminalized placing a symbolic object on property knowing that it 
“arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion or gender.”301  The Court accepted the state court’s ruling 
that the statute reached only “conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to 
incite immediate violence” and so amounted to “fighting words” 
unprotected by the First Amendment.302  Nevertheless, the Court struck 
down the ordinance as impermissible content-based restriction because, 
rather than prohibiting all symbolic “fighting words,” it proscribed only 
conduct that conveyed “a message of hostility” based on race, religion and 
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gender.303  Likewise, opponents of the proposed ethics rule would argue 
that while a state might be free under the First Amendment to generally 
prohibit lawyers’ race- and sex-based client-selection, it cannot selectively 
bar only race- and sex-based client choices that support hierarchical 
ideologies and interests. 
One could still draw a thin line between the unconstitutional statute in 
R.A.V. and the proposed ethics rule.  The Court in R.A.V. emphasized that 
the problem was not that the ordinance outlawed cross burning, but that it 
outlawed it based on its expressive content.304  That emphasis was called 
out when the Court upheld a statute that enhanced the penalty for a 
criminal assault if it were motivated by race bias.305  In Mitchell, the Court 
explained that “the ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly directed 
at expression (i.e., ‘speech’ or ‘messages’)” whereas the statute at issue in 
Mitchell singled out “bias-inspired conduct because this conduct is 
thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm.”306  Here, note the 
echoes of the basic expression/conduct dichotomy underscored in the 
canonical civil rights cases, along with the view from those cases that bias-
driven conduct inflicts a harm akin to violence.  One could argue that 
prohibiting race- and sex-conscious rejections of clients who occupied 
subordinate positions in the relevant legal context works to prohibit 
exclusion that inflicts the most serious harm on both vulnerable 
individuals and on the legitimacy of the legal system. 
The problem with that approach (and arguably with the Court’s 
distinction in Mitchell) is that the harm caused by the prohibited conduct 
seems to be a matter of ideas, and the First Amendment protects even 
allegedly harmful ideas from government suppression.  Thus, the Court 
cautioned in Button, the case that protected the NAACP’s solicitation of 
clients for desegregation litigation, that “First Amendment . . . protections 
would apply as fully to those who would arouse our society against the 
objectives of” civil rights.307  “For the Constitution protects expression and 
association without regard . . . to the truth, popularity, or social utility of 
the ideas and beliefs which are offered.”308 
You may already see the obvious fix for this problem.  To defeat the 
viewpoint discrimination claim, one could expand the exemption.  
Retaining the ban on client selection based on “stereotypes, stigma, or 
bias,” one could exempt all principled race- or sex-conscious client 
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choices that aimed to advance ideological goals, even if those goals are 
overtly racist and sexist.  After all, lawyers are allowed—indeed 
sometimes required—to advocate for unpopular and immoral policies and 
people.  A criminal defense firm advertising as “Lawyers for Rapists and 
Murderers” would be both accurate and ethical, if rather disconcerting, so 
why not Lawyers for White People, so long as the lawyers behind the sign 
could prove that their practice was dedicated to advancing the ideological 
goal of White supremacy, as opposed to simply excluding non-White 
clients?  Why not adopt an ethics rule that allows race-conscious client 
selection in the service of advocacy for any political goal, whether racial 
equality or racial hierarchy? 
Because such a rule would be unethical!  It is a travesty of legal ethics 
to allow lawyers to reject clients on account of race and sex in order to 
advocate for further entrenching race and sex hierarchy.  While lawyers 
are surely given constitutional protection to advocate for all kinds of vile 
anti-democratic interests and for clients who want to promote 
discriminatory structures, they should not be permitted to engage in 
conduct that perpetuates those structures.309  That is the line drawn by the 
canonical civil rights cases that prohibit restaurants and schools from 
practicing racial exclusion, even while protecting their right to advocate 
and teach segregation.  The turn to anti-classification prevents us from 
seeing that alignment because it takes what is just one potential method of 
achieving equality—formally equal, race-blind treatment—and enshrines 
it as the goal of equal protection. 
3. Anti-Classification’s Bite 
Critiques of anti-classification usually focus on equal protection, but 
the viewpoint discrimination analysis shows that the anti-classification 
approach infects First Amendment doctrine, too.  By insisting on formally 
equal treatment of subordinated and dominant groups, anti-classification 
turns a rule against conduct that perpetuates inequality into suppression of 
one side of a political controversy.  In a world where equal protection’s 
main goal is avoiding differential government treatment, rather than 
dismantling status hierarchy, the proposed rule’s anti-subordination 
exemption is transformed from constitutionally required intervention in 
discrimination to constitutionally prohibited restriction of ideas.  It is only 
if one understands equal protection as a mandate that government work to 
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achieve substantive equality, or at least allow private action toward that 
goal, that a viewpoint discrimination claim reliably fails.  It fails because 
the Equal Protection Clause makes eradicating status hierarchy a 
constitutional goal. 
Anti-classification doctrine insists that race-conscious government 
policies must have some “higher” goal beyond “racial balancing.”  But, 
anti-classification also sees equal protection as primarily, if not 
exclusively, aimed at ensuring racially balanced treatment.  The same 
opinions that denigrate mechanically proportionate racial representation as 
a measure of equality assume that the guarantee of equal protection 
requires a mechanical approach to evaluating government policies.  And 
so long as the treatment is formally the same, it doesn’t matter whether the 
direction of the change is toward or away from equality, reinforcing or 
dismantling status hierarchy.  In contrast, anti-subordination theory sees 
equal protection’s primary aim as eliminating status hierarchy.  From that 
perspective, as Lauren Lucas puts it, “the primary inquiry is not whether 
all identity groups are treated the same, but whether the alleged 
discrimination affects the claimants in a way that exacerbates their 
subordination.”310 
Our anti-classification structure has twisted up the goals and 
mechanisms of equal protection.  In the current regime, race- or sex-
conscious efforts to break down hierarchy are presumptively illegitimate.  
Rather than focusing on the problem of hierarchy and the goal of equality, 
anti-classification makes race- and sex-neutral policies themselves the 
goal of equal protection.  An anti-subordination view of equal protection 
reverses the ends-means calculus.  Government is empowered to use race- 
and sex-conscious means for the purpose of destabilizing hierarchy. 
The meaning and objectives of anti-classification and anti-
subordination doctrines are not static.  They develop in the context of 
contingent historical events and have not always been seen as mutually 
exclusive.  As Reva Siegel points out, the current “understanding that 
anticlassification and antisubordination are competing principles . . . and 
justify different doctrinal regimes” developed in part through debates 
about the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s rejection of separate but equal 
accommodations in Brown v. Board of Education.311  As I write this in the 
summer of 2020, the doctrinal demand for a “neutral” anti-classification 
approach to legal ethics seems particularly absurd.  Every day brings more 
evidence that Black Americans are stigmatized, burdened, excluded, 
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rejected, impoverished and, yes, even killed, by racist policies and 
practices.  Refusing to acknowledge the stark racial differences in death 
rates from Covid-19 and lethal police violence, and ignoring the legal 
system’s complicity in perpetuating those differences, is not neutral.  It is 
racist. 
Anti-classification should fail as a civil rights doctrine for the same 
reason that separate but equal failed.  Both distort rather than reflect the 
real-world meaning and effects of selecting one group and rejecting 
another, and so obscure real moral difference.312  Yet, though separate but 
equal is universally condemned as the paradigmatic failure of equal 
protection, anti-classification thrives in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, and spreads from equal protection to other constitutional 
provisions and regulatory structures.  Arguments for anti-classification are 
every bit as specious as the arguments in the 1950s that school segregation 
did not violate equal protection because its treatment of White and Black 
children was the same and that school integration violated White people’s 
freedom of association. 
As Charles Black wrote in his defense of Brown’s holding that 
segregated schools violated the Constitution’s guarantee of equal 
protection, “[s]egregation is historically and contemporaneously 
associated in a functioning complex with practices which are indisputably 
and grossly discriminatory.”313  The same is true today of the housing 
segregation, economic disparities, and lack of access to health care that 
subjects African Americans to greater risks in our current pandemic, to say 
nothing of the obviously racist police violence that streams stunningly 
across our video screens.  In America today, an anti-racist choice to 
represent Black clients is ethically distinct from a racist rejection of either 
Black or White clients.  Equating the two is utterly unrealistic.  And a 
constitutional interpretation that forbids lawyers from prioritizing 
advocacy for Black clients is a fantastic denial of history and of our own 
witnessing of the radical racial inequality that pervades our daily lives.  It 
produces what Charles Black called “the only kind of law that can be 
warranted outrageous in advance—law based on self-induced blindness, 
on flagrant contradiction of known fact.”314 
The upshot is that today’s dominant anti-classification ideology 
 
 312.   As Richard Primus puts it, “[t]he canonical failure of equal protection analysis, after all, was 
Plessy v. Ferguson’s refusal to understand that a formally neutral action might carry a clear meaning 
about racial hierarchy.”  Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 
1347 (2010).   
 313.   Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 425 
(1960).   
 314.   Id. at 426.   
406 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
insulates racist and sexist exclusion and distorts civil rights regulation.  In 
the realm of legal ethics, anti-classification produces a rule that protects 
everyone against discrimination except people seeking legal 
representation.  In an anti-classification regime, protecting professional 
practices aimed at making the legal system more egalitarian may require 
declaring, or at least tacitly suggesting, that it is ethical for lawyers to 
choose clients in ways that perpetuate prejudice and inequality.  There are 
arguments to be made from within the current doctrinal framework for 
regulation that realistically distinguishes demeaning stigmatic bias from 
equality-based professionalism—see Sections III.B.1 and 2 of this paper.  
But robust protection for such regulation would require something more.  
It would mean re-energizing the anti-subordination objectives once 
understood to be the driving force of the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection.315 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers are not the only professionals who may wish to use their 
skills to work toward a more egalitarian society.  And we are not the only 
ones whose efforts can be stymied by anti-classification rules.  What of an 
African American doctor practicing in a mixed-race neighborhood who 
wants to prioritize treating African American patients?  There are few 
opportunities to receive care from Black doctors and some empirical work 
suggests that for African Americans, seeing a doctor of their own race 
correlates with improved health outcomes.316  An anti-classification 
approach threatens, if not outright prohibits, that doctor’s practice.317 
If lawyers are not prepared to work under an anti-classification 
regime, it is not enough to simply avoid incorporating it in our self-
regulation—a sort of NIMBY approach to legal ethics.318  As the 
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professionals most responsible for defending civil rights, lawyers should 
be more creative and less self-protective.  We should try to craft a 
doctrinally viable approach that forbids exclusion based on stigmas and 
stereotypes and encourages professional practices aimed at dismantling 
the inequalities that flow from and perpetuate those stigmas and 
stereotypes.  And if that is not possible under today’s doctrinal 
frameworks, we should work to realign anti-discrimination law with the 
moral imperatives that drove its creation. 
 
